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5NGO ACCOUNTABILITY  AND AID DELIVERY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3.  to explain why particular accountability mechanisms 
are considered beneficial or dysfunctional
4.  to assess the extent of beneficiary involvement in the 
accountability mechanisms identified under objective 
1. and to investigate the factors preventing and/or 
facilitating accountability to beneficiaries, and
5.  to suggest alternative mechanisms of accountability 
that may alleviate the potentially dysfunctional impacts 
of donor-led upward-accountability mechanisms, and 
encourage the involvement of officers and beneficiaries 
in the field.
In addressing the study’s aims and objectives, the 
researchers have made the following key observations and 
recommendations.
There are a wide variety of accounting and accountability 
mechanisms used across the NGOs in this study. For 
formal upward accountability to donors, NGOs use annual 
reports, interim reports, performance assessment reports 
(written during projects), and performance evaluation 
reports (written at the end of individual projects). For 
downward accountability to beneficiaries, they use 
community consultations and dialogues, participatory 
reviews, and social auditing. 
The formality of upward reporting to donors brings with it 
a degree of discipline and accountability that is generally 
perceived to work for the benefit of aid projects. The 
fieldworkers judged that a number of aspects of existing 
upward-accountability mechanisms impede improvements 
in the effectiveness of some aid projects. Some of these 
issues are indicated below, along with recommendations 
for changes intended to ameliorate the adverse effects and 
capitalise on the positive potential of upward-accounting 
and accountability mechanisms.
Reporting formats often appear inflexible and provide little 
scope for reporting to INGOs (international non-
governmental organisations) and donors the views and 
experiences of officers and beneficiaries in the field. 
Coupled with project requirements that are often narrowly 
and rigidly specified by donors, these sometimes inflexible 
reporting mechanisms rarely allow feedback to donors on 
how projects should be adapted to be delivered more 
effectively in local conditions. It is recommended that 
donors ensure, when granting funding, that they require 
NGOs to exercise broader downward accountability to 
officers in the field, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. It 
may also be necessary for the mandated upward-
accounting and accountability mechanisms to provide 
flexibility in reporting formats, so that a range of possibly 
unforeseen issues revealed through downward 
accountability can be reported upwards to donors.
Donors’ need for periodic performance reporting that 
regularly demonstrates progress and goal achievement on 
a project sometimes conflicts with the longer-term nature 
of certain projects and the slower pace of work in some 
communities. Addressing this disconnection may require a 
In 2008 governments of OECD countries spent 
approximately US$135 billion on development aid, and are 
committed to spending over twice this amount (as a 
proportion of national income) each year by 2015. This is 
in addition to amounts donated by private individuals, 
charitable foundations and corporations. Much of this aid 
is channelled through non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) to front-line aid projects. 
Given the amount of aid funding, a small increase or 
decrease in the effectiveness with which aid funding is 
deployed can have a substantial impact on the lives of 
many highly impoverished people. The accounting and 
accountability mechanisms employed by NGOs delivering 
development aid can either contribute towards or impede 
the effectiveness with which aid funding is deployed in 
individual aid projects. 
The existing practitioner and academic literature on 
accountability within development NGOs argues strongly 
in favour of accountability mechanisms that provide 
accountability to, and capture the views of, beneficiaries 
and NGO fieldworkers. It is argued that this will enhance 
the effectiveness of aid delivery in individual projects by 
taking into account the views and experiences of those 
closest to the delivery of the aid. These arguments are, 
however, either derived largely conceptually – with little 
empirical support – or are based on the views of relatively 
senior officers in NGOs and not those of the workers or 
beneficiaries in the field.
Furthermore, there is a general lack of independent study 
into the impact on, and perceptions of, beneficiaries of 
attempts that have been made by some NGOs to expand 
their accountability. Those studies that have addressed 
this issue have tended to be narrowly focused on 
particular NGOs. They have therefore not been able to 
provide broader insights into issues at the local level 
associated with the development and implementation of 
new forms of accountability mechanisms.
Within this context, the aims of this research project are to 
investigate, through the experiences of those operating on 
NGO aid projects at the local level, the impact of different 
accounting and accountability mechanisms on the 
effectiveness of aid delivery. By investigating this issue, this 
study seeks to contribute towards the formulation of NGO 
accounting and accountability policies that will be effective 
in improving the efficiency and effectiveness with which 
aid funding is transformed into a reduction in human 
suffering in impoverished nations.
To fulfil its aims, this report addresses the following five 
specific objectives: 
1. to identify characteristics of the key mechanisms of 
accountability employed in a sample of international 
and local NGOs (in Ghana) 
2. to provide evidence of beneficial and dysfunctional 
impacts of the accountability mechanisms (identified 
under objective 1.) on the effectiveness of aid delivery
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beneficial long-term outcomes cannot always be delivered 
in a timescale to suit the donor communities’ shorter-term 
reporting demands and expectations. Such a change may 
require some donor governments to run long-term 
educational programmes at home, so that their electorates 
are aware of the important benefits of long-term aid and 
do not expect results from all aid projects within a four- or 
five-year electoral cycle. An example of such a programme 
is the Development Awareness Fund run by the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID), which 
aims to educate people in the UK about the role and 
benefits of overseas aid provision. DfID should ensure that 
this programme covers awareness raising about aid 
project timescales among the UK electorate.
Although some quantified performance indicators were 
considered helpful by our interviewees, they were 
concerned that, frequently, such indicators could dominate 
and obscure qualitative information about performance. 
The latter is necessary for the interpretation of 
performance metrics. Even where upward-accountability 
mechanisms provided scope for narrative performance 
information, there was a perception that many donors paid 
relatively little attention to this important context-setting 
narrative discussion. To address this issue, it is recommended 
that all upward-reporting formats aim to provide scope for, 
and encourage, a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
performance indicators. A further recommendation in this 
area is to allow debates and discussions with NGO officers 
in the field and beneficiaries to help determine appropriate 
performance indicators for specific projects. 
Upward-reporting mechanisms usually either did not 
provide scope for, or were perceived to discourage, the 
reporting of unintended consequences or failures in 
aspects of the delivery of aid projects. The fieldworkers 
considered that an understanding by NGOs and donors of 
these unintended consequences and failures would offer 
important learning opportunities to help improve the 
shape and delivery of current and future projects. To 
ensure that the effectiveness of current and future aid 
projects can be improved through learning from 
unintended consequences, mistakes and failures in 
existing projects, it is important that upward-reporting 
formats provide scope for, and encourage, the reporting of 
these issues. Furthermore, donors should consider clearly 
signalling that they recognise the value of this type of 
information and that they will use the information 
constructively – rather than ‘punishing’ perceived failures.
Some forms of partnership arrangement have given rise to 
accountability problems owing to tensions between the 
priorities of INGO local branches and those of the local 
community-based partner NGOs delivering the services. It 
is advisable that the memoranda of understanding 
between donors, INGOs and local partners are clear about 
the accounting and accountability responsibilities and 
expectations of each party. 
In addition to the upward-reporting mechanisms, this 
study found a number of downward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms currently in use. Fieldworkers 
generally considered these to be helpful, but power 
imbalances in practice between NGOs and beneficiaries 
appeared to impede their full effectiveness. The report 
contains the following recommendations for accountability 
mechanisms that could help improve the effectiveness of 
aid delivery.
It is necessary for NGO managers and fieldworkers to 
develop and implement practices that seek to counteract 
the negative effects of the power imbalances between 
NGOs and beneficiaries if the crucial and effective 
involvement of beneficiaries in the downward-
accountability processes is to be more fully realised.
Mechanisms should be developed by NGO managers to 
disseminate best accountability practice between NGOs.
NGOs should involve a broader range of stakeholders in 
the annual planning and budgeting of their activities – 
beneficiaries should be involved in more than just the 
annual review of individual projects.
Each NGO should use local radio and community radio 
phone-in programmes to facilitate discussion and 
engagements between itself and a range of its 
stakeholders, or even discussion between a number of 
NGOs and their stakeholders.
NGOs could make documentaries of project activities, 
involving beneficiaries in the making of these 
documentaries. In relation to this, they should develop 
some success stories as exemplars, explaining what the 
situation was before an NGO started a local project, the 
changes that occurred in this situation once the project 
had commenced, and including voices from beneficiaries.
NGOs should develop practices such that, in the early 
stages of a new project, the communities understand their 
responsibilities more fully. This could include discussion 
and agreement between all parties (before a project starts) 
of the accountability mechanisms that will be used and the 
information that each party will be expected to produce.
NGOs could develop peer review practices both to 
disseminate best practice (for both accounting and 
accountability mechanisms, and project implementation) 
and to identify and help any NGOs that are performing 
ineffectively. Such ‘lateral accountability mechanisms’ 
could also be useful to help officers in the field to put peer 
pressure on some INGOs if they identify practices at other 
NGOs that they consider would benefit their own 
operations. Although such self-regulation mechanisms are 
discussed in the academic and practitioner literature there 
was no evidence of their use in practice at a fundamental 
level in the NGOs studied in this research project – 
although several NGO field officers suggested that such 
peer review mechanisms would be useful.
Donors should automatically provide feedback to NGOs, 
officers in the field and beneficiaries.
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As part of their commitment to the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals, governments of OECD 
countries are obligated to spend 0.7% of their gross 
national income (GNI) on aid to developing nations by 
2015 (United Nations 2007). In 2008, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) flowing from governments of the 22 
countries that are members of the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee amounted to US$ 119.8 billion 
(OECD 2009a) – at 0.30% of GNI this amount must 
increase by two and one-third times (to approximately 
US$280 billion each year at current levels of GNI) to reach 
the agreed target by 2015. Total ODA in 2008 from all 
OECD members governments and multilateral agencies 
amounted to approximately US$135 billion (OECD 2009b).
A key reason why OECD (and other) governments provide 
this level of ODA funding is to attempt to alleviate current 
and future human suffering in impoverished nations. The 
provision of ODA funding, in addition to private sector and 
individual donations, is not the only factor in alleviating the 
impact of poverty. How these funds are used in delivering 
aid is also very important. To achieve the maximum 
alleviation of human suffering for each dollar of 
development funding, the funds must be spent in the most 
effective manner possible. 
Governments and intergovernmental agencies have 
recognised the need for maximising the effectiveness with 
which ODA is deployed. In 2005 the 2nd High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness agreed the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. ‘Mutual accountability’ was one of the five 
key areas that this declaration made clear were necessary 
to improve the effectiveness of aid delivery: ‘A major 
priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance 
mutual accountability and transparency in the use of 
development resources. This also helps strengthen public 
support for national policies and development assistance’ 
(2nd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2005: 8, para. 
47). In 2008, at the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, held in Accra, Ghana, the importance 
attached to accountability and transparency was 
reaffirmed. The agreement, the Accra Agenda for Action, 
declared that ‘Achieving development results—and openly 
accounting for them—must be at the heart of all we do. 
More than ever, citizens and taxpayers of all countries 
expect to see the tangible results of development efforts. 
We will demonstrate that our actions translate into positive 
impacts on people’s lives. We will be accountable to each 
other and to our respective parliaments and governing 
bodies for these outcomes.’ (3rd High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness 2008: para. 10).
Both these declarations covered only mutual 
accountability between donors and recipients (partners) at 
country level. They did not address the necessity of 
suitable accounting and accountability mechanisms at the 
project level. Much aid funding at this project level is 
channelled through the medium of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), which are responsible for how 
effectively the funding is translated into aid delivery. At 
both the project (NGO) level and country (governmental) 
level, accounting and accountability mechanisms have the 
potential to increase or decrease the effectiveness with 
which development funding is deployed. 
The existing practitioner and academic literature on 
accountability within development NGOs argues strongly 
in favour of accountability mechanisms that provide 
accountability to, and capture the views of, beneficiaries 
and NGO fieldworkers – with the aim of enhancing the 
effectiveness of aid delivery in individual projects by taking 
into account the views and experiences of those closest to 
the delivery of the aid. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, 
section 2.5, these arguments within the existing literature 
are, however, either derived mainly conceptually – with 
little empirical support – or are based on the views of 
relatively senior officers in NGOs. The prevailing arguments 
in favour of broader forms of NGO accountability have 
therefore essentially been developed without directly 
considering the views and experiences of those who these 
arguments assert should play a key role in the NGO 
accountability process – the fieldworkers and beneficiaries.
Furthermore, there is a general lack of independent study 
into the impact on, and perceptions of, beneficiaries of 
those attempts that some NGOs have made to expand 
their accountability. Those studies that have addressed 
this issue have tended to be narrowly focused on 
particular NGOs, and have therefore not been able to 
provide broader insights into issues at the fundamental 
level associated with the development and implementation 
of new forms of accountability mechanisms.
This report and the research project upon which it is 
based address these deficiencies in the existing 
practitioner and academic NGO accountability literature by 
investigating, through the experience of those operating on 
aid projects at the NGO fieldwork level, the impact of 
different accounting and accountability mechanisms on 
the effectiveness of aid delivery. By investigating this issue, 
and identifying the types of accounting and accountability 
mechanisms that enhance aid effectiveness and those that 
potentially undermine it, this study aims to contribute to 
the formulation of NGO accounting and accountability 
policies that will be effective in improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness with which aid funding is transformed 
into a reduction in human suffering in impoverished 
nations.
1. Introduction
81.1 AIms AND ObjectIves
The overall aim of this research project is to investigate the 
impact of a variety of accounting and accountability 
mechanisms on the effectiveness of aid delivery in NGOs 
at the local level in developing countries. In undertaking 
this aim, the following five specific objectives have been 
addressed:
1.  to identify characteristics of the key mechanisms of 
accountability employed in a sample of international 
and local NGOs 
2. to provide evidence of beneficial and dysfunctional 
impacts of the accountability mechanisms (identified 
under objective 1.) on the effectiveness of aid delivery
3. to explain why particular accountability mechanisms 
are considered beneficial or dysfunctional
4. to assess the extent of beneficiary involvement in the 
accountability mechanisms identified under objective 
1. and to investigate the factors preventing and/or 
facilitating accountability to beneficiaries, and
5.  to suggest alternative mechanisms of accountability 
that may alleviate the potentially dysfunctional impacts 
of donor-led upward-accountability mechanisms, and 
encourage the involvement of officers and beneficiaries 
in the field.
1.2 ReseARch methODs
To address these aims and objectives, a series of 
interviews and focus groups were conducted with workers 
and beneficiaries of a range of welfare aid delivery NGOs 
in Ghana. This comprised a total of 28 individual 
engagements as follows:
10 interviews in total with personnel in NGO head •	
offices, NGO umbrella organisations, and the ACCA 
office in Accra (the primary aim of these interviews was 
to inform the larger context within which the local 
accountability issues could be understood)
12 interviews with NGO fieldworkers/officers in •	
northern Ghana (centred on the regional capital of 
Tamale)
6 focus groups with NGO beneficiaries in northern •	
Ghana (centred on the regional capital of Tamale). 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were chosen as the 
core method for this study because they offer an effective 
strategy for gaining deep meaning and understanding 
from individuals actually working in the field. Previous 
work on NGO accountability has used interviews and found 
them to be successful in generating in-depth, meaningful 
insights (see, for example, Edwards and Fowler 2002; 
Ebrahim 2003a and 2003b; Dixon et al. 2006; Goddard 
and Assad 2006; Gray et al. 2006; Unerman and O’Dwyer 
2006a; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007). Focus group 
discussions were held with beneficiaries to encourage 
open conversation in a non-threatening way and to 
facilitate the expression of views from beneficiaries who 
may not have been used to discussing their opinions of 
their NGO benefactors.
The interviews and focus groups were recorded and the 
recordings were subsequently transcribed. Notes taken 
during the interviews and focus groups, along with the 
transcriptions, were then analysed to ascertain common 
themes in relation to the impact of different accounting 
and accountability mechanisms on the effectiveness of aid 
delivery. Some NGOs offered examples of documentary 
reports to show the content of these forms of 
accountability mechanism. These reports were reviewed 
and analysed. The core concepts of hierarchical and 
holistic NGO accountability, as explained in the next 
chapter, were used to help structure the analysis.
Following this analysis, a preliminary draft of this report 
was prepared. This preliminary report was used as the 
basis of a feedback and clarification workshop conducted 
with 24 field officers from the NGOs, who had been 
interviewed earlier in the project. The feedback and 
clarification workshop included not just the individuals 
from the initial interviews, but also some of their 
colleagues who had not been interviewed initially. Thus, 
although the clarification workshop included only NGOs 
interviewed for the study, there were present officers from 
these NGOs who had not themselves been interviewed 
before. Comments from this workshop, and two feedback 
and clarification meetings with beneficiary groups, were 
fed into the analysis contained in this final version of the 
research report.
1.3 the ReseARch sIte: GhANA
The research site, Ghana, is located on the west coast of 
Africa with a total area of 238,533 square kilometres. Its 
rapidly increasing population in 2000 was 18.9 million and 
was estimated at 22.1 million in 2007 (Ghana Statistical 
Service 2008). Ghana’s main development instrument is a 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2006–2009, 
aimed at ‘achieving sustainable, equitable growth, 
accelerated poverty reduction, and the protection of the 
vulnerable and excluded within a decentralized democratic 
environment’ (Republic of Ghana 2005). 
There is considerable NGO activity in Ghana, especially in 
northern Ghana where this research was undertaken. In 
the northern region of Ghana 60% of the population live 
below the national poverty level1 compared with the 
national average of 29% (Ghana Statistical Service 2008). 
Other development indicators, such as child under-nutrition 
and adult literacy rates, are lowest in northern Ghana, 
indicating a significant degree of underdevelopment and 
1.  The poverty line was defined in 2005/6 as an average annual 
income of 370 USD by the Ghana Statistical Service.
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poverty in that area (Ghana Statistical Service 2008). 
Ghana provides an excellent case study because of the 
diversity of INGOs and local NGOs operating there. In 
addition, NGO activity in Ghana covers several areas, 
including heath, education, agriculture, forestry, and 
poverty reduction programmes such as micro-credit 
(Porter 2003).
The NGOs selected for participation in this study included 
several INGOs and their partner local NGOs. In interviews 
with officers at the Accra head offices/regional offices of 
these NGOs, questions were asked specifically about the 
extent to which the issues raised applied more broadly 
than in just the Ghanaian context, as many of our 
interviewees had extensive experience of the issues being 
examined through their work in several other countries. 
According to these officers, many of the core issues were 
applicable across a range of countries, especially where 
these issues were determined by donor requirements (as 
many donors channel development aid to more than one 
country). Their perspectives indicated that although this 
project has collected and analysed Ghanaian evidence, its 
findings, conclusions and policy implications can provide 
more general lessons for the impact of NGO accounting 
and accountability mechanisms on aid delivery. 
1.4 OutlINe Of stRuctuRe Of thIs ReseARch 
RepORt
The next chapter of this report explains the context of NGO 
accountability and the core concepts of hierarchical and 
holistic NGO accountability used in the analysis. It also 
explains in depth how this report adds to the insights 
provided in existing academic and practitioner literature 
about the effectiveness of NGO accounting and 
accountability mechanisms. Chapter 3 then explains the 
main accounting and accountability mechanisms that this 
study has identified as being used in and by the NGOs. 
Drawing on insights from the interviews, focus groups and 
feedback/clarification meetings, Chapter 4 proceeds to 
identify and analyse the core issues for aid effectiveness 
arising from these existing upward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms. It also makes 
recommendations for changes to improve the impact of 
these mechanisms on the effectiveness of aid delivery. 
Chapter 5 then examines and analyses the effects of 
existing downward-accountability mechanisms on meeting 
the needs of beneficiaries and suggests some new and 
improved accountability mechanisms at the local level. The 
findings of the study are summarised and conclusions 
drawn in Chapter 6, where policy recommendations from 
Chapters 4 and 5 are also summarised, setting out 
changes in NGO accounting and accountability practices 
that may contribute to more effective deployment of 
development aid, whereby a greater reduction in current 
and future human suffering might be achieved for each 
dollar of aid funding.
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2.1 INtRODuctION
NGO accountability issues are complex primarily because 
of the ambiguous situation in which NGOs exist. Essentially 
intermediary organisations, they engage with multiple 
stakeholders with diverse demands (Jordan and van Tuijl 
2006; O’Dwyer 2007). Funding and other resources are 
often provided for locally based service-delivery NGOs by 
governments and fund-raising NGOs from developed 
nations. Many international NGOs (INGOs) similarly raise 
funds primarily in developed nations and distribute these 
through their local operations in developing nations. Local 
NGOs and the local operations of INGOs therefore act as 
an interface between international donors and local 
beneficiaries.
Although the development efforts of INGOs have 
traditionally focused on development as a need and 
development work as a gift, a recent trend identifies 
development more commonly as a right, with ‘the goal of 
development assistance involving an obligation to assist in 
[the] fulfilment of individual entitlements’ (Nelson and 
Dorsey 2003: 2014). This rights-based approach has also 
led to efforts on the part of INGOs to educate people 
affected by INGO projects and activities. These education 
activities are aimed at promoting understanding of 
individual rights, particularly human rights, and 
encouraging critical analyses of prevailing social and 
cultural values (Nelson and Dorsey 2003). Furthermore, 
the design of INGO projects has occurred in a participatory 
manner designed to recognise the rights of affected people 
to exert substantial control over these projects. 
2.2 upwARD AND DOwNwARD AccOuNtAbIlIty
NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the 
delivery of healthcare, education and other welfare 
services in many developing countries (see, for example, 
Dixon et al. 2006; Ebrahim 2003a; Edwards and Fowler 
2002; Goddard and Assad 2006; Gray et al. 2006; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007; Porter 2003; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer 2006a). A normal requirement attached to the 
funding provided to these NGOs is that the locally based 
NGO has to account to the donor government or INGO for 
the manner in which their funds have been used. Although 
this requirement can help to ensure that funding is not 
being misappropriated or spent on undesignated projects, 
it has also been shown to have problematic consequences. 
For example, there is some evidence that the 
accountability mechanisms employed (or required) by 
INGOs to address this need for so-called upward 
accountability to donors can prove counterproductive by 
damaging the effectiveness of service delivery to the 
NGOs’ beneficiaries (Dixon et al. 2006; Goddard and 
Assad 2006). To ensure that the funding provided by 
donor governments and NGOs gives the greatest benefit to 
its intended beneficiaries, it is clearly important for 
governments and other donors to be aware of the 
potentially damaging and counterproductive impact of 
some of the upward-accountability mechanisms they may 
be insisting that NGOs implement. 
Many NGOs and some donors now recognise that, in 
addition to ensuring that upward-accountability 
mechanisms are not counterproductive, they can enhance 
the effectiveness of NGO service delivery by ensuring that 
local NGOs, and the local operations of INGOs, are 
downwardly accountable to their beneficiaries (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman 2007). This downward accountability should 
be designed and implemented in such a way as to help the 
NGO identify the needs of its intended beneficiaries and 
assess how well it is addressing these needs (Ebrahim 
2003a). 
2.3 hIeRARchIcAl AND hOlIstIc AccOuNtAbIlIty
The concepts used in this report to frame and analyse the 
evidence about how different NGO accounting and 
accountability methods influence the effectiveness of aid 
delivery, draw on these ideas of upward and downward 
accountability. Upward accountability to donors is 
regarded as a form of hierarchical accountability (Fowler 
1996; Najam 1996; Dillon 2004; Kilby 2004; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman 2007; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008), 
characterised by fairly rigid accounting and accountability 
procedures. This form of accounting typically provides 
donors with a written (usually quantified) account 
comprising information in a form they have requested to 
help ensure that the funds they have donated have been 
used for the purposes they have specified. This is usually 
in the form of a one-way flow of information from the NGO 
to the donor, with the focus being on the efficiency with 
which the donors’ funds have been spent (in terms of 
spending the funds on the particular projects as specified 
by the donors) (Edwards and Hulme 1996a, 1996b; Fowler 
1996; Dillon 2004).
The one-way flow of information in hierarchical 
accountability often does not, however, provide either the 
NGO or the donor with information about how effectively 
the funding has been, or can be, used to provide the 
maximum alleviation of human suffering for each dollar of 
aid (Fowler 1996; Leen 2006; Najam 1996; Dillon 2004). It 
seems to presume that in specifying details of the projects 
upon which their funding must be spent, donors know the 
most effective way to alleviate poverty at the local level. 
Where donors have common project requirements and 
specifications across a number of locations, it also 
presumes that variable local conditions do not affect the 
manner in which aid projects should be run to deliver the 
maximum benefit. 
In practice, there is a distance between the donors in more 
developed nations and the localised aid projects, and 
differences exist in local conditions that affect the impact 
of different aid delivery processes. This implies that to help 
maximise the effectiveness of aid delivery, local knowledge 
needs to be used in deciding and specifying the details of 
individual aid projects at the local level (Najam 1996; 
Hilhorst 2002; Dillon 2004).
Ascertaining this local knowledge, and feeding it into 
decisions regarding the most effective shape of aid 
projects, requires multilateral dialogue with a range of 
2. the context of NGO accountability
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people (Hilhorst 2002). These include the local NGO 
fieldworkers/officers and beneficiaries, who are aware of 
the local conditions on the ground that can affect the 
effectiveness of specific detailed NGO project 
implementation (Edwards and Hulme 1996a, 1996b; 
Fowler 1996; Kilby 2004).
If donors and NGOs engage in this dialogue with local NGO 
fieldworkers and beneficiaries (among other stakeholders) 
and feed the information into aid delivery decisions, and if 
aid funding is motivated by human-rights considerations, 
then it can be argued that donors and NGOs are 
accountable to beneficiaries (Atack 1999; Scott-Villiers 
2002; Kilby 2004; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006b; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman 2008). Furthermore, donors can also be 
regarded as accountable to NGOs. These broader 
accountabilities arise where one party (such as a donor) is 
regarded as having a responsibility to another party (such 
as the NGO itself, and/or its beneficiaries). Although such 
downward responsibilities will not usually be legally 
defined and enforceable (in contrast to the contractual 
responsibilities a company’s directors owe to its 
shareholders and creditors), they may be accepted as 
moral responsibilities (Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006b: 368). 
After all, it can be argued that donors who do not have any 
formal contractual or legislative responsibility to give aid 
will have often been motivated to give this aid by 
recognition of a moral human-rights obligation to help 
those suffering from poverty. 
Where one party has recognised that it has a responsibility 
to another, that party is accountable to the other for how it 
has behaved in relation to this responsibility. Thus, while 
formal legal responsibilities give rise to a formal duty to 
provide an account (such as requirements for company 
directors to provide formal accounts to shareholders), 
recognition and acceptance of moral responsibilities can 
be regarded as giving rise to moral duties to provide an 
account of how the party with the moral responsibility has 
acted in relation to its responsibility (Unerman et al. 
2007).
Holistic accountability (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008) is the concept that 
encompasses this broader range of accountabilities – not 
just upward from the NGO to the donors, but 
accountability in multiple directions between a range of 
stakeholders including donors, the NGO, NGO officers in 
the field and beneficiaries (see also Edwards and Hulme 
1996a, 1996b; Najam 1996; Kilby 2004). Holistic 
accountability therefore includes hierarchical upward 
accountability but informs and augments this with 
information flows to and from other stakeholders. As 
argued above, holistic forms of accountability are desirable 
both from a practical perspective, in that they help ensure 
that donors and NGOs are informed of the most effective 
ways to deploy finite aid funding, and from a moral 
perspective in that they help discharge moral duties of 
accountability derived from moral responsibilities. In 
practice there is a continuum between the two concepts of 
purely hierarchical and wholly holistic accountability.
2.4 pRevAleNt NGO AccOuNtAbIlIty mechANIsms
Drawing on the existing academic literature on NGO 
accountability, the previous sub-section has discussed the 
key accountability concepts underpinning the focus of this 
study. This sub-section outlines the common mechanisms 
used by NGOs, which tend to facilitate hierarchical upward 
accountability and/or broader, more holistic accountability 
dialogue between an NGO and other stakeholders. This 
outline draws on the widely cited work of Ebrahim (2003a), 
who has carefully collated and classified these 
accountability mechanisms. Table 2.1 identifies the various 
individual mechanisms, while the key characteristics of 
each of the mechanisms (primarily as explained by 
Ebrahim 2003a) are briefly discussed after the table.
table 2.1: NGO accountability mechanisms 
Accountability mechanisms Accountability to whom?
Disclosure statements and 
reports
Upwards to donors and 
oversight agencies
Performance assessment and 
evaluation 
Upwards to donors and 
oversight agencies
Participation 
Downwards from NGOs to NGO 
beneficiaries
Social auditing To NGOs themselves
Self-regulation 
Of NGOs themselves as a 
sector
Adapted from Ebrahim (2003a).
Disclosure statements and reports
Disclosure statements and reports are documents that are 
required by donors and oversight agencies. The nature of 
the reports varies from NGO to NGO and between different 
countries. Generally, they contain both financial 
information and operational data about the projects. In 
some countries, for example in the United States, they are 
legally required documents.
performance assessment and evaluations
Performance assessment and evaluation reports assess 
the impact of projects. Typically, the performance 
evaluation is conducted at the end of a project, while 
assessments are conducted mid-way through it. 
Increasingly, aid programmes and projects are specified 
using Logical Framework Analysis (LFA). Project aims, 
expected results and performance indicators are specified 
at the start of the project. Performance assessments and 
evaluations are intended to appraise the extent to which 
project goals have been achieved. In some instances, 
performance assessments and evaluations are used by 
donors to determine whether further funding should be 
provided. 
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participation
Participation as an accountability mechanism reflects the 
process of involving beneficiaries in decisions about 
projects. At the simplest level it includes the sharing of 
information with beneficiaries and consulting with them, 
though the decision making remains with the project 
planners and funders. Participation may also be undertaken 
with higher levels of beneficiary involvement. Beneficiaries 
may participate in project-related activities through their 
provision of labour for projects. At an even higher level of 
participation, beneficiaries may be encouraged to 
negotiate and bargain over decisions with the NGOs.
social auditing
Social auditing is a process whereby the NGO assesses 
and reports on its social performance and ethical 
behaviour (Ebrahim 2003a). It incorporates all the 
accountability mechanisms discussed above. Its use 
enables the views of a range of stakeholders (such as 
beneficiaries, donors and NGO officers) to influence the 
organisational goals and values of the NGO.
self-regulation
Within the self-regulation accountability mechanism, the 
NGO sector develops for itself standards and codes of 
behaviour. Self-regulation may be formal, thereby offering 
visible codes of conduct for NGO behaviour. This may 
involve a process of certification of NGOs. It may also 
include the development of networks. Self-regulation may 
also be approached in a less formal manner. The overall 
aim of self-regulation is to increase NGO credibility and 
accountability (Kwesiga and Namisi 2006).
2.5 exIstING INsIGhts ON NGO AccOuNtAbIlIty At 
lOcAl level, AND cONtRIbutIONs Of thIs stuDy
There is a paucity of research that gathers evidence from 
NGO fieldworkers and beneficiaries regarding the 
effectiveness of different accountability mechanisms in 
identifying and addressing their needs, especially more 
holistic forms of accountability mechanisms.
The literature on accountability of development NGOs is 
replete with largely conceptual work arguing for the 
introduction of accountability mechanisms that privilege 
the voices of beneficiaries and/or local NGO fieldworkers/
officers in developing countries (Najam 1996; Ebrahim 
2005; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006a). Much of this 
research also proposes specific accountability 
mechanisms embracing this focus as a means of assessing 
the effectiveness of NGO actions (Ebrahim 2003a). This 
work is limited, however, in a number of respects. 
First, although some empirical work has engaged directly 
with beneficiaries to ascertain both how they experience 
accountability and the extent of their involvement in 
accountability mechanisms (see, for example, Dixon et al. 
2006; Goddard and Assad 2006), most research methods 
used to study NGO accountability do not prioritise direct 
engagements with beneficiaries and/or local NGO officers 
in the field. Hence, although prior literature expresses 
concern about how certain forms of NGO accountability 
tend to distort the accountability of NGOs away from 
‘grassroots and internal constituencies [such as locally 
based NGO officers in the field]’ (Edwards and Hulme 
1996b: 962) and sometimes strives to present solutions to 
correct this perceived deficiency, researchers themselves 
have been less inclined to engage directly with 
beneficiaries and/or NGO officers in the field. This 
engagement is necessary if we are to deepen our 
understanding of local constituencies’ experiences of 
accountability mechanisms, in particular the impact these 
mechanisms have on their daily lives. 
Secondly, although much literature expresses concern that 
narrow accountability relations, ignoring beneficiary 
concerns, can have potentially adverse effects on NGO 
mission achievement and organisational learning (Ebrahim 
2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007), there are few 
independent investigations examining how NGOs’ attempts 
to broaden their accountability to address beneficiary 
concerns are perceived by beneficiaries themselves. These 
investigations are especially important as, despite the 
often-claimed increase in accountability mechanisms 
privileging participation and partnership by northern 
Ghanaian NGOs with local NGOs and beneficiaries, a 
significant body of evidence remains sceptical as to the 
substantive contribution these approaches are making to 
the lives of the people whom northern NGOs seek to assist 
(Aryeetey 1998; Dillon 2004; Ebrahim 2005; Dixon et al. 
2006).
Thirdly, studies of attempts to implement more 
beneficiary-focused forms of accountability (see Dawson 
1998; Scott-Villiers 2002) have tended to be very specific, 
largely focusing on highly specialised individual NGOs 
rather than examining a range of NGOs in particular 
contexts. Research embracing a range of NGOs is 
necessary to obtain a broader view of the implementation 
issues surrounding NGO accountability mechanisms, 
which could be used to inform policy debates.
This study addresses the three perceived gaps in the prior 
literature outlined above, as follows.
First, its focus is on a range of perspectives on 
accountability from different NGO officers in the field and 
beneficiaries, thereby privileging voices that are largely 
absent from prior research studies. 
Secondly, by embracing these perspectives, the study 
affords a unique in-depth, bottom-up examination of the 
perceived efficacy of attempts to broaden accountability to 
beneficiaries. 
Thirdly, the study’s focus on a range of NGOs allows the 
collation and consideration of a wide variety of 
perspectives that can be used to facilitate broader policy 
recommendations. 
The first stage in addressing these issues is ascertaining 
the nature of the accountability mechanisms currently 
employed within the NGOs examined in this research 
study. Chapter 3 explains the key characteristics of these 
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NGO accounting and accountability mechanisms.
3. existing accounting and accountability mechanisms
3.1 INtRODuctION
This chapter identifies and explains the different types of 
accountability mechanisms used in practice by the NGOs 
interviewed in this study. Table 3.1 summarises these 
different mechanisms within the five broad categories of 
accountability mechanism set out in Table 2.1 (page 11). 
As the aim of this chapter is to explain the accounting and 
accountability mechanisms that are commonly used by 
the NGOs in this study, analysis of the effectiveness and 
role of these accounting and accountability mechanisms is 
undertaken in later chapters. 
table 3.1: existing NGO accounting and accountability mechanisms identified in this study
Accountability mechanism
Financial 
information Narrative
Quantitative 
performance 
indicators
Written or 
oral Frequency
Stakeholder 
focus
Disclosure statements and reports
Annual reports Yes Yes Yes Written Once a year
Range of 
stakeholders
Interim reports Yes Yes Yes Written
Monthly, 
quarterly, or 
half yearly Donors
Performance assessment and evaluations
Assessment reports Yes Yes Yes Written Continuous
Donors and 
internal 
stakeholders
Evaluation/final project report Yes Yes Yes Written
At end of 
project Donors 
Participation and beneficiary involvement
Community consultations and dialogues Not always Yes Yes Oral Varies Beneficiaries
Participatory review reports Not always Yes Yes
Written and 
oral Varies 
Range of 
stakeholders 
Informal reporting Not always Yes Yes Oral Continuous Beneficiaries
Social auditing
Accountability notice boards Yes Yes Yes Written Quarterly
Range of 
stakeholders
Newsletters Yes Yes No Written
Monthly, 
quarterly
Range of 
stakeholders
Self-regulation
Networks and NGO membership 
organisations Not always Yes Yes
Written and 
oral Varies
Sector and 
regional 
NGOs
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3.2 DIsclOsuRe stAtemeNts AND RepORts
There was evidence that two main types of report are 
produced or contributed to by the NGO officers. Each year 
all NGOs produce a summative annual report of all 
activities. In many NGOs the officers also provide interim 
reports of their activities throughout the year. Additionally, 
NGOs are audited as part of the external financial audit 
processes.
Annual (or summative) reports 
These reports summarise all an NGO’s activity for the year. 
Typically, they are glossy publications similar to corporate 
annual review reports, resembling in particular the 
operating and financial reviews produced by many listed 
companies. Most INGOs produce annual reports on their 
global activities with brief descriptions of individual 
country activities.
Some local branches of INGOs, in addition, produce their 
own publications about their annual activities. Table 3.2 
summarises the contents of a typical annual report using 
categories that commonly appear in these reports.
Interim reports
Several of the NGOs studied produce interim reports of 
their activities regularly on a monthly, quarterly or half-
yearly basis. Separate interim reports are usually 
produced for each project being undertaken. These 
reports summarise the activities of the project in question 
for a specified period. 
A typical report provides a brief overview of the period’s 
activities followed by a description of these activities in a 
little more detail. The reports identify the planned activity 
and compare this with the actual activity that has been 
achieved for the period. The reports usually contain 
physical measures of performance. The differences 
between the planned and actual activities are usually 
explained fairly briefly. Some reports also summarise the 
financial resources used in the provision of activities 
during the period and sometimes cumulatively. In general 
terms, the interim report resembles a typical variance 
report statement. Table 3.3 provides an example of a 
typical financial interim report.
table 3.2: typical INGO local branch annual report
Contents Description
Mission statement 
 
Vision statement and core values 
 
Field activities 
 
List of activities; indication of achievements, eg number of boreholes drilled; number of 
hand wells installed 
Organisational activities 
 
Communication; marketing; human resources 
 
Financial information 
 
Income and expenditures; Expenditure by activity; Cash-flow statements 
 
table 3.3: An example of a financial summary interim report
Activity items Objectives Output achieved Remarks
Budget for this 
quarter
Actual 
expenditure 
Remarks % of 
total budget 
spent
Monitor activities of 
clients
Visit all 150 
clients
Only 103 clients 
visited 
69% visited
Late receipt of 
funding £ 350 £250 71%
Overheads 
Administration costs 
Staff costs 
Equipment costs    £ 30 £50 160%
15NGO ACCOUNTABILITY  AND AID DELIVERY 3. EXISTING ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
Most of the interim reports examined in the course of this 
study had standard reporting templates that the officers 
had filled in. Such interim reports require the officers to 
provide brief narrative commentary on the problems and 
challenges that they faced in undertaking the activities. 
Other interim reports were more reflective and included 
sections about the learning that the officers derived from 
undertaking the activities. Table 3.4 provides an example 
of the headings of a typical interim report to be filled in by 
officers.
In the reports we saw, the commentary tended to be brief 
and in many instances took the form of bullet points. The 
interim reports tended to conclude with brief details of 
plans for the next period.
table 3.4: example of commentary in an interim report
Sub-heading Commentary
Activity Capacity-building workshop: assertiveness training
Objective To build the capacity of 100 women in a selected community
Target group Women’s groups
Challenges Late disbursement of funds
Outputs Number of women trained
Indicators Photographic evidence 
3.3 peRfORmANce AssessmeNt AND evAluAtIONs
Performance assessment and evaluation reports are 
written at various times during the life of the project. Some 
NGO officers considered the assessment reports and the 
evaluation reports to be similar, while other officers 
described differences between them. Performance 
evaluation reports are typically written at the end of a 
project or at the end of a funding stream, and therefore 
are final project reports. On the other hand, performance 
assessment reports tend to be written on a continuous 
basis. These reports are more comprehensive than the 
regular quarterly and annual reports. 
The main audience for the performance assessment and 
evaluation reports is donors. The performance assessment 
and evaluation reports concentrate on the extent to which 
predefined project aims and objectives have been 
achieved. In addition, they usually consider issues of 
sustainability and organisational learning, and these 
aspects appear to be less evident in the more regular 
disclosure reports.
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The performance assessment and evaluation reports tend 
to consider the context in which the project has been 
undertaken. Some also look strategically at performance. 
The overall aim of this type of reporting seems to be to 
provide evidence of the potential longer-term impact of the 
projects. As is the case with the other regular reports, 
these reports usually include both financial reports and 
narrative reporting of the challenges experienced in 
undertaking the projects.
In Table 3.5 the headings and contents of an exemplar 
final project evaluation report are provided.
In order to take a broader look at performance, all NGO 
officers usually draw up the performance assessments. For 
example, one NGO officer explained that in order to assess 
performance they held a staff team retreat, a partners’ 
review and reflection meeting, as well as community 
meetings. Some NGOs described how sister NGOs from 
other towns are involved with the process of developing 
the performance assessment reports. 
table 3.5: final project report
Headings Example of content discussed
Introduction
How report was developed; staff retreat, partnership review and reflection; team members; 
length of project
Political, economic and social changes Ghana named as a member of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
Progress against project aims and 
objectives
Aims identified; tables provided summarising NGO interventions; each objective defined 
and progress analysed; learning highlighted for each objective 
Financial summaries Expenditures by activities
Partnerships and working relationships Number of partners worked with
Administration and management Details about the NGO
The future of the programme Plans for the future; direction of new work 
Challenges Resource constraints; low capacity of partners; poor road networks
3.4 pARtIcIpAtION AND beNefIcIARy INvOlvemeNt 
This research study identified that beneficiaries were 
involved in the accountability processes mainly through 
participatory meetings. Two types of participatory 
engagement were commented upon by the NGO field 
officers. These were community consultations and 
dialogues, and participatory reviews. NGO officers also 
referred to social auditing involving beneficiaries as a 
useful accountability mechanism, because it focused 
specifically on how communities viewed individual NGOs’ 
activities. This section explains the extent to which these 
mechanisms involved beneficiaries in the accountability 
processes.
community consultations and dialogues
In many NGOs, community consultations are held with 
beneficiaries and are usually undertaken at the start of 
projects. Usually all members of the local community are 
invited to these meetings in a traditional way by the chief 
(often using a call through drumming). During these 
meetings, the officers attempt to assess the needs of 
beneficiaries. Some examples of the sort of statements 
that officers made during interviews are shown below.
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Before we come out with our plans we organise 
community meetings to derive their needs. (NGO 10, an 
officer)
We interact with them and they tell us very, very 
interesting stories and we take them all into 
consideration…We take the focus group approach, we 
thereby meet the women separately and men too, 
separately. Then we encourage the specialists – that is 
the food and agriculture staff, the health staff, education 
staff to come out clearly with their technical observations. 
In the presence of the people we are able to develop – I 
mean come out with a document that represents the real 
needs of the people. We then design the project…what 
we called the area development programme, and then we 
submit it to our support offices. (NGO 2, a country 
director)
The meetings are usually held in the communal meeting 
places of the beneficiaries’ communities (for example, 
under the shade of a large tree). In some instances 
separate meetings for men and women are held. The 
consultation meetings are mainly led by the NGO field 
officers. Alternatively, the community dialogues may be led 
by the partner organisations (such as other, more locally 
based NGOs), where the NGO operates through such 
partners. The community consultations are often recorded 
photographically to provide evidence to donors that they 
have taken place. Reports are also usually written to 
summarise what took place during the meetings. 
Discussions held as part of this study with the 
beneficiaries suggest that financial information tends not 
to be part of this initial meeting. 
Community consultation is also used as part of the 
planning process, to identify how to proceed with a 
particular project. During this type of consultation, for 
example, the community members may attempt to refine 
the broad objectives for a project. One example we were 
given was a situation in which an initial agreement was 
made with beneficiaries to provide labour and material for 
the fencing of several acres of land to prepare for 
farming. Through the consultations with beneficiaries it 
became obvious that this was not feasible because of the 
quantity of wood required for the fencing of the large 
areas. The beneficiaries made it clear that the approach 
was not feasible: ‘It dawned upon them that getting the 
trees and sticks to fence that sizable amount of land was 
not going to be easy. So basically they brought out this 
issue. We had to change the strategy and commission 
others to do the fencing. This had cost implications but 
we had to change. (NGO 6, a programme director in 
Accra head office)
Where the revised objectives did not match the scope of 
an NGO’s activities, these attempts were not always 
successful. During a focus group discussion one 
beneficiary commented: ‘Our roads are in a bad way and 
we asked them also to sort them out. But they [the NGO] 
said they are not into road construction’. 
3.5 pARtIcIpAtORy RevIews 
Participatory reviews are held with beneficiaries at 
specified points after the implementation of projects. They 
usually occur at the end of the project, although some 
NGOs hold them half way through the project. Most of the 
NGO officers interviewed confirmed that they held 
participatory reviews. 
Such participatory reviews are required by many of the 
donor INGOs, but they tend to vary in form. Some NGOs 
have developed a very sophisticated approach to 
participatory reviews but others use approaches that are 
not so well developed and tend to be more informal. 
Between these two extremes, each of which is discussed 
below, we observed varying degrees of participation.
the more ‘sophisticated’ participatory review
A very small number of NGOs in this study use highly 
developed and sophisticated participatory reviews. These 
take place in several stages and are held with 
communities, partners and NGO officers, in various 
permutations. For instance, they may be held only 
between the partners and communities without the NGO 
officers being present. They may also be held between the 
partners and the NGOs without the presence of the 
beneficiary groups. In some instances the whole local 
beneficiary community is present while in other instances 
only community representatives attend the meeting.
The NGO officers suggested that one role of participatory 
review is to determine how effectively a project is being 
undertaken. This type of review therefore tends to focus on 
the impact of the NGO intervention and to plan for the next 
stage of the project. The review becomes one where the 
beneficiaries reflect on the work of the NGO. Officers 
explained the approach.
Yes, the community members are involved in the 
evaluation, the chiefs are involved in evaluation, the 
opinion leaders are involved in evaluation. (NGO 2, 
country director)
And during this review process, communities, partners, 
are given the space to say positives, negatives, challenges 
of the work for the previous year. (NGO 9, an officer)
When we go, we first interact with the focal person, and 
then the head teacher and we get information as to the 
impact of our intervention. Then we interview one or two 
children ‘how is it?’ ‘Oh, I am not very happy’. (NGO 14, 
an officer)
In principle, during the participatory review beneficiaries 
may comment on the performance of the NGOs and reflect 
on whether the performance indicators they had 
previously agreed at the planning stage have been 
achieved. There are issues of power (discussed in section 
5.4 in Chapter 5), however, that in practice may prevent 
beneficiaries from criticising the work of the NGOs.
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Various methodologies are used for participatory 
meetings. Commonly, focus groups are held separately 
with men, women and occasionally children. These were 
often followed by plenary sessions (referred to as 
community forums) in which the groups were brought 
together.
Table 3.6 provides examples of comments from reports of 
participatory meetings. 
 
 
table 3.6: examples of comments from reports of 
participatory meetings
NGO Positive Negative
NGO 9 
 
 
 
 
Teaching and learning 
materials supplied to 
the infant classes have 
opened the minds of 
our children 
Community reports are 
sent in foreign 
languages and without a 
vernacular version. This 
is something that did 
not go down well
NGO 10 
 
 
Community members 
now engage in minor 
activities 
The drugs are still not 
available even when you 
have money to pay for 
them
 
The participatory review meetings are usually 
photographed and in some cases they are filmed. A report 
is written about the process. The photographs, videos and 
reports provide evidence for donors and the head office of 
the INGOs that the meetings have taken place. 
Informal participation
At the other end of the participatory review continuum is 
the informal participation and communication that the 
NGO officers explained they held with their beneficiaries. 
Such interaction tends to be regular. Members of the 
community are encouraged to talk to the NGO officers 
during their interactions with them. 
Some beneficiary groups also indicated that they 
approached the NGOs informally as the need arose; for 
example, to request ad hoc small extensions to the 
deadline to make the payment of instalments due in a 
micro-credit scheme.
3.6 sOcIAl AuDItING
NGO officers tended to define social auditing as the 
process of assessing the impact of the NGO’s work on 
beneficiaries’ lives:
[social audit] is a way for beneficiaries to assess the 
impact of an NGO (field officer’s comment at feedback 
session)
a process of assessing access and utilisation of social 
services by beneficiaries (field officer’s comment at 
feedback session)
a process/opportunity for both beneficiaries and 
development agencies to look back at what has happened 
(field officer’s comment at feedback session).
For example, one NGO officer discussed how a social audit 
pilot had been carried out. The aim was to gather 
information about how the community viewed the NGO’s 
activities. This social audit was undertaken as a 
participatory process. The NGO officer explained that the 
social audit was led by the community from the start to 
the end. The community decided what to look at, how to 
gather information and how to hold the meeting. 
Both in this example, and in the broader definitions of 
social audit offered by other NGO officers, the role of social 
audit is very close to the notion of participatory reviews 
discussed in the previous sub-section. It does not involve 
aspects of auditing as traditionally understood within the 
accounting community.
3.7 self-ReGulAtION
There was no evidence that self-regulation through forms 
of peer review took place at the local level in any of the 
NGOs interviewed for this study. Nonetheless, peer review 
was suggested by several of the field officers as a potential 
new accountability mechanism to help improve the 
effectiveness of aid delivery. This point is discussed in 
section 5.5 in Chapter 5.
3.8 summARy
This chapter has explained the key aspects of the main 
accounting and accountability mechanisms currently used 
by the NGOs examined in this study. The next two chapters 
examine and analyse perceptions of the main beneficial 
and dysfunctional aspects of these accountability 
mechanisms in terms of their impact on the effectiveness 
of aid delivery. Chapter 4 examines perceptions of the 
advantageous and disadvantageous impacts of existing 
upward-accounting and accountability mechanisms on the 
effectiveness of aid delivery, and makes recommendations 
for changes to reduce the potentially adverse effects and 
capitalise on the potential benefits of upward 
accountability. Chapter 5 then explores similar issues in 
relation to downward and more holistic forms of 
accountability.
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4.1 INtRODuctION
This chapter explains and analyses the perceptions of the 
NGO officers and beneficiaries about the impact of existing 
upward-accounting and accountability mechanisms (as 
identified in Chapter 3) on the effectiveness of aid delivery. 
Field officers consistently suggested that upward-
accountability requirements of donors and INGOs 
dominated much of their work. 
Existing academic literature on NGO accountability, mostly 
derived from conceptual studies or from empirical work 
with senior NGO officials not working in the field at the 
local level, has tended to portray upward-accountability 
mechanisms as problematic (Dillon 2004; Kilby 2004; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007; O’Dwyer and Unerman 
2008). There have therefore been few, if any, research 
insights into the advantages and benefits associated with 
these mechanisms. 
In contrast to some of the impressions given by these prior 
studies, the picture emerging from the analysis in this 
chapter is that most of the existing upward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms have both advantageous and 
disadvantageous impacts on the effectiveness of aid 
delivery. As would be expected with any analysis of this 
kind, there were differing views among the interviewees 
regarding the relative merits and demerits of the existing 
mechanisms. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the 
key issues indentified in the following areas, each of which 
is discussed in a separate section:
the key perceived benefits of formal upward-accounting •	
and accountability mechanisms
upward-accountability requirements that dictate the •	
detailed activities undertaken by NGOs at the local 
level, with potentially detrimental impacts on the 
effectiveness of aid delivery
the conflict between the need for periodic reporting to •	
donors and the timescales on some projects
accountability mechanisms that dictate how •	
performance is measured, although these performance 
measurements do not always (or even usually) permit a 
balanced portrayal of the performance and impact of a 
particular project
the important, but often overlooked or discouraged, •	
role of the reporting of unintended consequences and 
failures in aspects of project implementation
a number of issues related to upward accountability in •	
NGO partnership arrangements.
The final section of this chapter summarises the key 
reasons why upward-accountability mechanisms produce 
potentially detrimental impacts on the effectiveness of aid 
delivery, while recognising the benefits of aspects of 
existing upward-accounting and accountability 
mechanisms. It also makes suggestions for changes in 
upward-accountability practices to address the perceived 
deficiencies.
4.2 beNefIts Of upwARD-AccOuNtING AND 
AccOuNtAbIlIty mechANIsms
Current upward-accounting and accountability 
mechanisms and practices were perceived by many of the 
NGO officers in the field as having a number of beneficial 
impacts. Important among these are the trust they helped 
engender: during a feedback session an officer 
commented, ‘they help to build trust and confidence 
between donors and the NGOs that implement the donors’ 
programmes’.
As part of this building of trust, some NGO officers 
suggested that upward-accountability mechanisms 
allowed their work to be transparent to donors and 
sponsors. This transparency meant that the likelihood that 
funds would be misused could be reduced:
They [funders] have to see some transparency in you…
how you have handled their money. They do not want any 
misuse of funds. You have to exercise a lot of 
transparency and accountability. (NGO 8, an officer)
Upward-reporting mechanisms helped some officers share 
information with donors to show that they were working 
effectively and meeting specified programme objectives. 
Developing such confidence in the work of the NGOs was 
perceived as helping to ensure continued donor support. 
One officer described upward accountability, as a process 
of information sharing, in this way:
Information sharing is very important to us. You provide 
the paper evidence of what is going on. Yes, they are our 
main funders and they have areas of interest and focus. It 
is…the information that you gather that will inform 
whether you are actually meeting programme objectives 
or not. Unless your project meets their objectives, they 
might feel very reluctant to support. (NGO 10, an officer)
Another officer suggested that upward-accountability 
mechanisms allowed the funders to cross-check and 
monitor activities without being physically present. It was 
especially important to explain variances within the 
reports: ‘If they release the funds to you, you have to give 
them the requirements by way of how the money was 
spent. This is the amount we received and how we spent 
the money…Give a true reflection…’ (NGO 12, an officer).
4. Impacts of upward-accountability mechanisms
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The officers also suggested that upward-accountability 
mechanisms were beneficial because they help ‘keep 
NGOs on their toes’ and help them stay focused. The 
reporting processes acted as guides or frameworks to 
direct the NGO work. One officer explained during 
interview: ‘You allocate your money quarterly and at the 
end of the quarter if there is a big under-spend, then it 
means you didn’t carry out the activities in that quarter 
and basically it’s about explaining the variances’ (NGO 15, 
an officer).
Another officer explained that the periodic evaluation 
processes allowed the NGO to work in a structured way 
towards its goals. One of these evaluations had led the 
NGO to make contingency plans when it became obvious 
that funding would not be continued. 
There was an evaluation and we went into the third 
phase, which is lasting from [date] to [date]. At our 
meeting in [date] I mean, they [the funders] harped on 
the need to ensure sustainability should funding cease…
how to ensure the sustainability of your intervention…We 
were sensitised on these [issues]. All partners will need 
to build in that kind of strategy, to ensure the sustenance 
of our intervention. We are getting apprehensive that 
there might not be a continuation, so we try to put up 
something into place…shock absorption mechanisms. 
(NGO 14, an officer)
Some officers suggested that the regular reporting meant 
frequent communication between funders and NGO 
officers. This helped to clarify issues and it also helped to 
develop good working relationships between NGO officers 
and donors. For example, during the feedback session an 
officer suggested that the upward-accountability 
mechanisms: ‘help to standardise common understanding 
of programmes’. Another said: ‘You know, we are 
corresponding regularly, and there may be certain area 
problems, management problems, financial, anything. So, 
they [funders] give support [to] resolve any challenges that 
we may have’ (NGO 15, an officer). 
Regular reporting upwards to donors and funders was also 
seen as beneficial because the standardised formats gave 
the local NGO staff ‘exposure to international standards’. 
This was mainly because the funder-specified templates 
were used by all the countries in which an INGO operated. 
This also meant that the officers could in some respects 
influence the INGO’s work: ‘We have a monitoring checklist 
which is applicable to all countries. Each country office 
puts in their inputs and this then helps us to shape the 
values of the NGO’ (NGO 11, an officer).
Some upward-accountability mechanisms may, therefore, 
allow the officers to perceive that they belong to the INGO 
community. The standardised frameworks were considered 
even more beneficial where they also gave the officers 
room to incorporate country-specific details or where they 
derived from engagements with local NGOs, so that the 
frameworks did not become constraints. One officer used 
the example of a global framework for developing strategy 
to show this.
But as I said it’s just the framework that they [funders] 
give. Maybe they’ll say…’we want to work in essential 
services’… But each country will then decide – once it 
falls within that framework of essential services – we 
decide based on the realities of the country. (NGO 6, an 
officer in Accra head office)
Whenever the upward-accountability mechanism allowed 
some flexibility in reporting, the mechanisms were seen in 
a positive light, but in many instances this was not the 
case.
4.3 DIsADvANtAGes Of upwARD-AccOuNtAbIlIty 
mechANIsms
The beneficial impacts of upward-accountability 
mechanisms discussed in section 4.2 were widely 
appreciated by the field officers. Nonetheless, there were 
widespread concerns that rigidity in these mechanisms 
can and does have a profound and often 
counterproductive effect on the specific activities 
undertaken at local level. 
Although they recognised that it is entirely reasonable for 
donors to specify that their funding should be used to 
further their broad long-term charitable or policy 
objectives, many NGO officers indicated that they often 
have to work on a narrow range of specific issues and 
projects that the donors are prepared to fund. They also 
suggested that as donors are often unaware of local 
conditions, or how these local conditions affect the 
efficiency with which specific types of project help to 
realise the broader long-term objectives of the donor, such 
narrow specification of detailed projects and issues is 
often counterproductive. They maintained that to ensure 
the most effective realisation of the broader long-term 
charitable, developmental and policy objectives of many 
donors, mutual accountability was necessary so that local 
views are fed into decisions over the shape and nature of 
the activities undertaken.
Nonetheless, there was a widely held fear among field 
officers that NGOs worked with the risk that donor 
sponsorship could be curtailed at any time, so it was 
thought necessary to meet (and be seen to meet) the 
donors’ narrowly specified requirements. This fostered a 
‘culture of silence’ among the officers, with the donors 
often being told what the NGO officers thought they 
wanted to hear: ‘So at the end of this you tell your donor 
what activities [are] done within the period and then that’s 
what the narrative will tell in terms of narrative reports and 
then the financial aspect of it, will also then tell…Mostly 
very nice facts in line with the donors’ [specifications]’ 
(NGO 16, an officer). Another officer described the risk that 
donors would ‘apply the handbrake’ if the specific 
activities did not suit the donor’s current agenda. 
Thus it was perceived that the information provided in 
upward-accountability reports had to demonstrate that the 
NGO was meeting the specific perceived agendas of 
donors. Other information that the officers considered 
important was usually included in the narrative upward-
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accountability reports as ‘challenges’ faced by the officers, 
but overall there was a concern that reporting formats did 
not always (or even usually) permit the NGO or the officers 
in the field to report or focus on what they considered to 
be important points for specific projects.
One NGO officer gave a broad example of how specific 
information provision in upward-accountability reports, 
addressing the narrow specifications of donors, reinforced 
an ineffective use of resources. This example related to the 
donor specification of geographical areas where activities 
were undertaken, where this specification led to sub-
optimal use of aid funding. In this example, donors 
specified the districts where activities were to be 
undertaken, in many cases preferring rural areas over 
urban communities: ‘The demand is high in Tamale [the 
regional capital]. But because of the donor, you have to 
satisfy the donor…These are the challenges we are facing; 
a beggar has no choice’ (NGO 12, an officer).
In this case the need for the service was acute in urban 
Tamale, but this need was largely ignored by the NGO 
because the donor’s specified preference was for rural 
development – with the consequent need for the NGO to 
report on rural development. Although the officers 
understood that resources were limited, their preference 
would have been to be able to choose the areas in which to 
work. One officer explained: ‘The resources are limited…we 
are with the people all the time and we know the areas in 
which these facilities are needed most’ (NGO 12, officer).
Because of the requirement to report about the use of 
funds in the particular geographical area, a report about 
alternative needs was not provided. 
Other NGO field officers suggested that donors seem to 
favour projects aimed at women and female children. To 
these officers this meant that there was a gender 
imbalance in the development process. Recommendations 
were made in the annual reports for funding for boys 
education: ‘Even though we make recommendations in the 
reports that this is the situation, they do not take it. We risk 
boys’ being left behind’ (NGO 13, an officer).
The officer also explained that further evidence was 
provided in an impact assessment and project evaluation 
report about the gender imbalance in the funding of 
education, but the problem persisted. 
In other cases, targets are specified rigidly with 
requirements for beneficiaries to be 50% boys and 50% 
girls, whereas social and/or cultural factors might make 
this balance inappropriate for a particular project. Field 
officers explained that where such rigid targets are linked 
to rigid reporting formats, the reporting formats do not 
always allow scope for explaining why a different gender 
balance is more appropriate, often requiring the NGO to 
adhere to the rigid target even when inappropriate. 
Some of the beneficiary focus groups in this study also 
raised concerns over the impact of a lack of flexibility in 
rigidly specified details of some projects. For example 
where micro-credit schemes strictly require weekly 
repayments from borrowers, and do not incorporate the 
flexibility for making fortnightly or monthly repayments, 
the strict application of weekly repayments sometimes 
conflicts with the trading cycle of a business funded by 
particular micro-credit loans. This lack of flexibility 
compromises the potential sustainability of some micro-
businesses funded and encouraged via the micro-credit 
scheme.
There are issues with donor specifications for the 
particular technology to be funded, in cases where 
narrowly specified accountability requirements of donors 
might inappropriately determine the nature of NGO 
activities. For example, with the provision of water facilities, 
donors sometimes require the use of specific technologies 
that the officers argued might not be the appropriate 
technology for a particular community. The accountability 
reports to the donors require the NGO to report on their 
use of their specified technology, however, rather than 
report on the overall impact of the aid: ‘For example if the 
solution to the water problem in the community is…a 
small community pipe system, but the donor says I want 
to see x number of boreholes or x number of hand-dug 
wells, definitely such a community will lose out on that’ 
(NGO 3, an officer at Accra head office). 
When officers explained the issues involved in this 
problem, it was apparent that some water-aid donors only 
fund specific types of technology, for example the hand-
pumping equipment to be placed at the head of a hand-
dug well. Such technology is much less expensive on a 
per-unit basis than more complex technology, so the 
donors might believe that by narrowly specifying the 
equipment they are prepared to fund, they will be able to 
provide water to a greater number of communities, but 
this risks ignoring local conditions. Many communities in 
the past would have received similar technology from 
other aid agencies, with members of the community 
putting in considerable work to dig the well on top of which 
the hand-pumping equipment was installed. In many of 
these communities, however, the wells had run dry after a 
relatively short period, indicating that the local conditions 
would not allow this type of technology to provide a 
long-term solution to lack of access to water. Where rigidity 
in the upward-accountability requirements of the donor 
does not allow NGO field officers to report on problems 
and difficulties with the technology specified by the donor, 
they will act in line with donor specifications so that they 
can report ‘good performance’. Hence there is a risk that 
some NGOs will continue to install ineffective technology. 
This clearly wastes the resources provided by the donor, 
for whom a more effective long-term achievement of their 
overall water relief aims might involve funding a smaller 
number of more expensive water delivery systems.
Thus, with narrowly specified upward-accountability 
mechanisms, the community may be disadvantaged in the 
sense that the detailed permitted uses of the funds 
specified by the donor do not always suit beneficiary 
requirements, and the accounting and reporting 
mechanisms required by the donor do not often allow for 
22
much (if any) questioning of the appropriateness of these 
detailed permitted uses. In these circumstances, many of 
the officers in the field explained that they are compelled 
to meet the donor conditions. Such officers suggested that 
there is a need for more flexibility with funding, and with 
the accounting and reporting mechanisms associated with 
this funding, which is not always forthcoming.
Reinforcing these examples at a more general level, a field 
officer referred to a ‘culture of silence’ that existed, with 
accountability reports concentrated on reporting only 
those items required by the donor. In other instances, it 
was argued by NGO officers that the specified reporting 
formats do not focus on what they regarded to be the 
important issues or points in particular projects, requiring 
them to report on factors that they did not always consider 
to be as essential as other factors that were not covered in 
the rigid reporting formats.
The upward-accounting and accountability reports do not, 
therefore, always accurately reflect the experiences, 
observations and preferences of the field officers. During 
the interviews some officers were critical of the reports 
they had provided. They seemed to be saying that the 
contents were sanitised. Some items might be excluded 
from the reports because the officers believed that they 
did not fit into the reporting format given by the donors. 
The reports then ended up sterile and seemed to be the 
same year after year.
It’s like it is the same story because if you look at the 
quarterly reports that we submitted to [name of NGO 
donor] like pieces of activities, administration is there, 
construction is there, health and hygiene is there and 
research and development is there…Not everything will 
go in but we will summarise what has been done into the 
report. (NGO 12, an officer)
Another respondent said: ‘Because their objectives are the 
same we make the same report each year’ (NGO 15, an 
officer). There were, however, a few examples provided by 
NGO officers of flexibility in funding and accountability. 
Some donors were prepared to fund innovations that 
complemented their core objectives. A case in point was 
the development of a ‘child savings scheme’ initiated by 
officers of an NGO. Although the NGO had corporate 
requirements applicable to all countries in which it 
operated, and for which all NGO officers had to follow the 
global accountability guidelines, so long as officers’ 
suggestions supported programmes they could be 
undertaken. For example, one explained that: ‘If we want to 
make changes, that will mean we will have to suggest our 
ideas for consideration. And when it is worthy of it, they 
can be shared with other countries so that...we can 
support our programmes…They are always prepared for 
innovation’ (NGO 11, an officer).
Although this example sounded quite positive, it was 
further explained during the interview that the innovations 
had to be undertaken within the original budgets. This 
example does, however, show that there were sometimes 
opportunities for innovations and their dissemination. 
Holistic forms of accountability can be important in 
identifying the opportunities for these types of innovation, 
and disseminating information about them, because they 
take into account the views of NGO officers and 
beneficiaries in the field.
Nonetheless, the field officers noted that even where 
upward-accountability reporting formats did provide scope 
for the provision of a broader range of information to 
donors, a challenge was posed by the capacity of an NGO 
to collate and report this information. Not all NGOs had 
the spare resources to spend time on reporting much 
more than the minimum required information.
4.4 the cONflIct betweeN the NeeD fOR peRIODIc 
RepORtING AND tImescAles ON sOme pROjects
Analysis of the interviews indicated that there were some 
problems and tensions between the accountability 
mechanisms and the sometimes slow nature of 
development work, as well as slow decision-making 
processes. For example, in discussing the provision of 
development aid, one officer in an NGO explained that the 
periodic reporting requirements of donors did not always 
(or even usually) consider that the slow local decision-
making processes of some beneficiary communities had to 
be followed and accommodated. There was a conflict when 
donor accountability requirements meant working with the 
communities but also reporting regularly. These conflicting 
requirements could adversely affect the work of the NGOs. 
Now the funds usually come and you have a certain time 
within which you need to give reports on output. Yes, we 
have been given the funds and in six months’ time we 
expect some results. [Regardless] of the fact that you 
work with institutions that you don’t [have] control over, 
these may be decision-making processes that you cannot 
easily change – you have to work within them…By the 
time you will need to work with the community and 
ensure that the decisions are taken for you to be able to 
move, maybe by that time the community would have lost 
out and they cannot access the particular funds. So what 
do we do?…So sometimes when donor funds come with 
stringent conditions, it is the ultimate beneficiary that 
suffers. (NGO 3, an officer in Accra head office)
The issue highlighted in this quote is that working with 
communities and beneficiaries can be a slow process. The 
accountability reports are required quickly and too 
frequently. As a result, some reports end up being 
repetitive and may not be wholly reflective of the actual 
activities that had taken place. Officers in several instances 
argued for annual rather than quarterly reports to help 
address these concerns – although the nature of some aid 
projects is that they come to fruition and deliver results 
over a longer period than an annual reporting cycle.
This was especially a concern where levels of poverty and 
illiteracy meant that beneficiaries found it difficult to 
maintain momentum in project fulfilment.
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We had a case just last year where the construction 
coordinator had to go to rehabilitate quite a number of 
hand-dug wells that we did some years ago…The fact is 
that the northern region has the highest illiteracy rate, 
which also affects our performance. It takes a lot, it needs 
time to actually go through the process for community 
members to understand the process before taking it up. 
So that’s another challenge that we have. But donors 
normally think that when you go to a community, they 
would understand and they would do this but it takes a 
whole lot of time. (NGO 12, an officer)
Where donors themselves have to report upwards (for 
example to their governments, which themselves want to 
demonstrate to their electorates their action and the 
impact of their aid), the result may be that important 
projects may be relegated if they are schemes that can 
only produce positive effects and deliverables a long time 
after provision of resources.
4.5 AccOuNtAbIlIty mechANIsms thAt DIctAte 
INAppROpRIAte peRfORmANce meAsuRemeNt
One of the issues discussed most by the NGO field officers 
was the impact of accountability mechanisms on the way 
performance is measured. The focus of upward reporting 
is often on physical outputs. This is because programme 
outcomes are usually defined by the physical outcomes 
included in the initial project proposals that donors have 
agreed to fund.
In the first place, in the operation plan you would have 
indicated in each quarter what you are going to do, in 
terms of the numbers. (NGO 11, an officer)
The number of water sanitation trainings that I have to do 
will reflect in the plan…I will report on the number of 
people who have been trained, this number of people 
have been involved; location, etc. (NGO 12, an officer)
[In the report] we say as a result of our intervention so 
many numbers of children are being retained who would 
have otherwise dropped out of school. (NGO 14, an 
officer)
Although most officers considered output measurement 
necessary and important, some suggested that it might 
not be the most important aspect of their work. One NGO 
officer described reports that contained the number of 
health outreach meetings and the number of patients 
visited as forming the focuses of upward-accountability 
reports on mental health activities. He also described the 
number of life stories of mentally ill persons that had been 
collected as part of the funded project, and as a result 
were commented upon in the upward-accountability 
reports. He argued that the actual content of the life stories 
was more important and could be used to publicise the 
NGO’s work, which involved raising awareness of the plight 
of mentally ill people. Although the narrative reports 
contained details of these life stories, they were not published 
but were retained in the INGO database on the intranet. 
Funding had not been provided for their publication.
At our last internal review, the director was around and he 
read one of the stories and said ‘this is very, very rich and 
anybody in the public domain who reads it would be very 
interested’. Because it gives much information about 
what we do and also about the prevailing situation of 
mental health in the country. (NGO 10, an officer)
Despite the potential of this rich narrative in the 
accountability process, the pressure on the officers and 
the NGO was to publish the baseline reports (which 
showed briefly, in narrative and quantitative form, the 
situation on the ground before the NGO intervention) and 
project evaluation reports (which simply showed the 
number of interventions that the NGO had made).
In other cases, the reporting of quantitative outcomes was 
sometimes seen to be counterproductive and not very 
useful, as this quote from a senior officer indicates.
So I think that reporting and matching outcomes with 
numbers, matching that with budgets sometimes causes 
programmes actually [to] be less effective because, oh 
let’s cut this, let’s cut that, we want this money to reach 
this many people. (NGO 5, an officer in Accra head office)
One performance indicator that field officers commented 
upon was the need to report on the number of people that 
the funding had reached. They explained that this indicator 
did not always reflect the overall impact of an NGO’s work. 
For example, an education NGO might have enrolled 90% 
of its intended beneficiaries in schools in a particular year, 
allowing it to indicate strong performance to its donors. In 
fact, the quality of the actual education might have been 
poor, for a variety of reasons, so that the impact of the 
education programme was much less than indicated by a 
90% enrolment rate.
Accountability based on such outputs was therefore not 
always considered to be particularly useful or informative. 
Some officers were left frustrated.
I mean…people say…we are going to train 10,000 
farmers. There’s a big difference [between] having a 
one-day farmer field day for that many people and having 
a three-week training session. And so you know, it just 
becomes cumbersome when, especially government 
agencies, put all kinds of requirements for you to meet. 
You know such huge numbers of people…they require 
you to touch so many different people in so many 
different ways. But realistically the impact is not there 
just because you’ve worked with that many people. So 
that’s something that frustrates me a little bit. (NGO 5, 
an officer in Accra head office)
Nevertheless, the field officers did recognise that some 
quantified performance indicators are helpful, especially 
where these performance indicators focus on outcomes 
and where upward-accountability reporting formats 
encompass these helpful output indicators. For example, 
they considered that it was important to report on 
indicators measuring the behavioural changes that occur 
in a community as a result of a particular engagement. It 
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was also argued that quantitative data can allow longer-
term, more systematic and consistent monitoring of a 
project.
Despite the widespread recognition that some 
performance metrics were helpful, as indicated earlier in 
this section, there was a perception that an overemphasis 
on quantitative performance indicators in the upward-
accountability reports did not help to reflect the overall 
effectiveness of some projects. From the perspective of the 
fieldworkers, the appropriateness of quantitative 
performance indicators, and the balance between 
quantitative and qualitative indicators in upward-
accountability reports, seemed to depend upon the nature 
of each NGO and the nature of specific projects. It would 
therefore be simplistic to conclude that quantified 
performance indicators are either always helpful or always 
damaging. As with many of the accountability issues 
explored in this report, the situation is much more 
complex than this and should not be portrayed as a 
dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative 
performance indicators.
Nonetheless, when performance reporting did encompass 
a mix of quantified indicators and narrative, there was a 
belief by some senior NGO officers that donors focused on 
the quantified elements, while the messages about 
performance in the narrative disclosures tended to be 
‘lost’ or ignored: ‘In the end people will look at the tables 
and what has been spent rather than the message in the 
narratives’ (NGO 7, country director at Accra head office).
Thus, even where quantified performance indicators are 
augmented with qualitative information explaining more 
complex and nuanced information than is permitted by 
the quantified metrics, there was a belief that many donors 
simply use the quantified metrics and largely ignore the 
valuable qualifications and explanations of local conditions 
contained in the accompanying narrative.
Generally, the officers argued for the assessment of the 
overall impact of NGO work. This needed to be measured 
more holistically, taking into account successes and 
failures as well as the more social impacts that could not 
be easily reduced to a quantified metric. This last concern 
is akin to frequent criticisms of quantified performance 
measurement systems in both the private and 
governmental sectors, where these systems evoke the 
comment that: ‘what can be easily measured is what 
counts, but what really counts cannot always be easily 
measured’.
4.6 ROle Of RepORtING uNINteNDeD 
cONsequeNces AND fAIluRes
Compounding the problems caused by donors’ sometimes 
counterproductive focus on quantified performance 
indicators, there was a perception that upward-
accountability mechanisms tend to concentrate on the 
success stories, or the positive aspects of specific aid 
projects. As such they do not give adequate scope for 
reporting unintended consequences or failures in aspects 
of the projects. Fieldworkers generally considered it very 
important that NGOs and donors understood these 
unintended consequences and failures, as they provide 
valuable learning opportunities that could be used to 
improve the shape and delivery of current and future 
projects. At a feedback session, one field officer 
commented: ‘It’s an opportunity for donors to appreciate 
the issues’, while another pointed out that ‘the unintended 
consequences can be important in achieving the aims’.
Although some donors wanted to be provided with 
information about unintended consequences and failures 
in aspects of project delivery, in other instances the field 
officers indicated that they found difficulties in reporting 
problems because of the upward-reporting mechanisms of 
some NGOs, and because donors did not give scope for 
the reporting of this information. Some field officers 
perceived a lack of interest by donors in this type of 
information: ‘Challenges – they do not want to know. They 
never come back to ask for further information about how 
to deal with these’ (field officer’s comment at feedback 
session).
Furthermore, some field officers indicated that there was 
reluctance on their part, or on the part of their NGO, to 
report unintended consequences or failures. The officers 
explained that the NGOs preferred to emphasise (or to 
hear about from the field officers) the successes rather 
than the failures in aid delivery projects. There was a 
concern that they, or their NGO, might be held responsible 
for any perceived failures in the delivery of a project, and 
that provision of information about unintended 
consequences or failures would reflect badly on the NGO: 
‘We hide the failures; we do not want to be seen as 
failures’ (field officer’s comment at feedback session).
Other officers indicated that reporting of failures might be 
hindered by limited capacity within some NGOs to 
incorporate into their reports information about these 
failures, their implications, and the learning opportunities 
they offered.
One officer also explained that the donors are more 
interested in short-term impacts, and there was a concern 
that reporting short-term setbacks might lead to the 
withholding of further funding: ‘But normally, what the 
donor would want to see is the [short-term] impacts to see 
whether it’s really worth [allocating the next phase of the] 
money’ (NGO 14, an officer).
In the longer term, however, failures could help the NGOs 
learn and ensure more sustainable development by quickly 
appreciating and responding to the causes of a short-term 
failure. Fieldworkers considered these longer-term benefits 
of learning from unintended consequences and failures in 
aspects of programme delivery to be just as important as 
the shorter-term adverse effects with immediate potential. 
Some of the field officers also maintained that reporting of 
unintended consequences in aspects of project delivery is 
important as it provides an opportunity to inform donors 
about some of the difficulties the NGOs face on the ground 
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at the local level. It was therefore perceived as important 
that upward-accountability mechanisms make provision 
for, and encourage (without penalising), the reporting to 
donors of unintended consequences and failures in 
aspects of project delivery.
There was a perception that in practice reporting of some 
unintended consequences and failures would be 
acceptable and constructive, while others might prove 
more damaging. This was seen to depend on the nature of 
the challenges posed by the unintended consequences or 
failures. If they were fundamental in terms of the ethos of a 
donor, there was a perception among the field officers that 
reporting them could seriously risk compromising future 
funding from the donor.
4.7 upwARD AccOuNtAbIlIty Issues wIth 
pARtNeRshIp ARRANGemeNts
A variety of partnership working arrangements existed 
between larger NGOs (often the Ghanaian branches of 
INGOs) and smaller local community-based NGOs that 
carried out specific projects. These arrangements can be 
broadly divided into three main types in terms of their 
implications for upward-accountability mechanisms.
1.  Local officials of INGOs work directly with beneficiaries 
(in other words, no local partner NGOs are involved in 
aid delivery). Here, the field officers collect and directly 
provide information for upward-accountability reports.
2.  Donors and/or INGOs provide funding to local 
community-based partner NGOs through the local 
branch of the INGO. Here, the local partner NGO will be 
required to provide the local branch of the INGO with 
specified information to enable the local branch to fulfil 
its upward-accountability requirements to the INGO 
and donors. As the local community-based partner 
NGO is dependent on the local branch of the INGO for 
continued flows of funding, this relationship does not 
give rise to many substantial upward-accountability 
problems, other than those generally associated with 
upward accounting as discussed in the previous 
sections in this chapter.
3. Donors and/or INGOs provide funding directly into the 
bank accounts of local partner NGOs, and this funding 
does not go through the local (or even national) branch 
of the INGO. In these circumstances the local or 
national branch of the INGO is often still responsible for 
providing upward-accountability reports, and 
incorporating information about projects run by local 
partner NGOs. As the provision of these reports is not 
the direct responsibility of the local partner NGO, there 
can be tensions between the INGO’s field officers (who 
are responsible for fulfilling upward-accountability 
requirements) and the local partner NGO in the 
provision of information for these upward-
accountability reports.
Given that it is the third type of partnership funding 
arrangement that seems to give rise to additional 
difficulties in implementing and fulfilling upward-
accountability requirements (over and above those already 
discussed in previous sections in this chapter), the 
remainder of this section focuses on this type of funding 
arrangement.
Within this type of arrangement, the accountability duties 
of local community-based partner NGOs are usually 
covered in a memorandum of understanding that governs 
the working arrangements for a particular partnership. In 
many of these situations the local office of the INGO 
(through the field officers of the INGO) is required to 
monitor and report upwards upon the activities of the local 
community-based partners. Despite the accountability 
commitments made by local partner NGOs within 
memoranda of understanding – which should assist the 
field officers of the INGOs in fulfilling their own 
accountability requirements – operating these 
arrangements in practice creates several tensions that the 
officers have to manage. This is especially the case when 
the local community-based partner NGO does not 
prioritise reporting to the local office of the INGO, possibly 
because the local partner sees its funding as coming 
directly from the donor. In such circumstances partners 
may not fully appreciate the role of providing 
accountability information to the local branch of the INGO, 
which does not have a direct sanction of suspending 
funding flows if the information is not provided.
The local branches of the INGO are required to submit the 
accountability reports to donors and are therefore 
required to monitor the work of the partners, but it is the 
partners who work directly with beneficiaries and 
communities. The partners are therefore usually required 
to provide monthly, quarterly and yearly reports to the 
local branch INGO, which are then incorporated into the 
reports the local branch INGO sends to international 
funders.
Instead of passing it [the funding] through the country 
office to go down to the programmes and then to the 
community, it is rather sent directly to them. So we 
weren’t happy about that because sometimes it is very 
difficult to have control. If we have the funding, we can 
tell them you have to do this to meet this particular 
deadline. But without that, they still get their funding all 
right. So sometimes we cannot meet the [reporting] 
deadline because of their delay. (NGO 11, an officer)
Some of us in the organisation think that for purposes of 
accounting properly, money should channel to [name of 
NGO] for [name of partner], but our donors do not agree. 
But they channel the money to the [name of partner] 
and that makes it difficult. (NGO 15, an officer)
The NGO officers were concerned because they are 
accountable to the INGO for the work being undertaken by 
the partners. There is always the risk that the funding will 
be curtailed if the partners do not undertake the donors’ 
specific requests and directions regarding the use of the 
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aid funding. There are frequent accountability demands 
from the head office, which cannot be addressed because 
of resistance from the partners.
Sometimes they [the partners] say we are too harsh. It’s 
like sometimes with the reporting…you will have finished 
with this report. Then the following day you get a call 
from [name of funder], We need this extra information. 
You have to go down to the programme team again. 
When you get there, they are frustrated and they 
complain. They will tell you that you were here yesterday, 
you are here today and next week you will be here! The 
pressure is too much on them. It is the reporting. That is 
the problem. (NGO 11, an officer)
The frustration of operating this type of partnership is 
clearly experienced at all levels. As can be expected, these 
frustrations are compounded by the frequency of 
reporting. Inflexibility in some reporting practices also 
means that activities the officers consider reasonable that 
are undertaken by partners often go unreported.
Now we allow them [partner organisations] to carry out 
their own activities and they do some very good work 
which does not fit with the objectives. Now and then we 
allow them to do their own activities, sometimes they 
come out with very good activities. But it gets lost…I 
think if they [donor NGO] would allow reporting formats 
to be designed according to the needs of the country, 
that particular country, so that there could be flexibility in 
the reporting, I think that could help out. Sometimes it’s 
so strict, the formats. I mean, it’s so strict that sometimes 
we don’t know how to incorporate things. (NGO 15, an 
officer)
4.8 summARy Of ADvANtAGes AND DIsADvANtAGes 
Of exIstING upwARD-AccOuNtAbIlIty mechANIsms, 
AND suGGestIONs fOR chANGe
This chapter has discussed key perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of existing upward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms. Although there was general 
recognition that the formality of upward accountability 
brought with it a degree of discipline and accountability 
that worked to the benefit of aid projects, NGO staff judged 
that certain aspects of the existing upward-accountability 
mechanisms impede improvements in the effectiveness of 
some aid projects. 
The following points summarise the key reasons why 
upward-accountability mechanisms are potentially 
detrimental to the effectiveness of aid delivery, and 
suggestions for changes in upward-accountability 
practices to address these deficiencies.
Reporting formats
Upward-accountability reporting formats often appear 
inflexible and provide little scope for reporting to INGOs 
and donors the views and experiences of officers and 
beneficiaries in the field. Coupled with project 
requirements that are often narrowly and rigidly specified 
by donors, these sometimes inflexible upward-reporting 
mechanisms rarely allow feedback to donors about how 
projects need to be adapted to be more effectively 
delivered in light of local conditions. To address the widely 
perceived adverse effects these issues have had on the 
effectiveness of aid delivery, we recommend that donors 
ensure that their granting of funding entails the 
requirement that NGOs engage in more holistic (downward 
and lateral) accountability engagements (as discussed in 
the next chapter), and that their required upward-
accounting and accountability mechanisms provide 
flexibility in reporting formats so that a range of possibly 
unforeseen issues revealed through downward 
accountability can be reported upwards to donors.
timescales and time constraints
Donors’ need for periodic performance reporting that 
demonstrates progress and positive deliverables on a 
project sometimes conflicts with the longer-term nature of 
some projects and the slower pace of work in some 
communities. Addressing this disconnection between the 
time constraints of some donors and the practicalities of 
some types of aid project may require a willingness by 
donors to recognise that highly beneficial long-term 
outcomes cannot always be delivered in a timescale to suit 
the shorter-term reporting demands and expectations of 
some donor communities. Such a change may require 
governments in donor nations to embark on long-term 
educational programmes at home, so that their electorates 
are aware of the important benefits of some long-term aid 
projects, and do not expect payback from all aid projects 
in a time frame to suit four- or five-year electoral cycles. 
An example of such a programme is the Development 
Awareness Fund of the UK Department for International 
Development (DfID), which aims to educate people in the 
UK about the role and benefits of overseas aid provision. 
DfID should ensure that this programme raises awareness 
among the UK electorate about issues of aid project 
timescales.
Although some quantified performance indicators are 
considered helpful, there is a concern that in many cases 
there is an unhelpful dominance of quantified performance 
indicators, which predominate over the qualitative 
information about performance that is necessary for the 
interpretation of performance metrics. Even where 
upward-accountability mechanisms provide scope for 
narrative performance information, there is a perception 
that many donors pay relatively little attention to the 
narrative discussion that helps to provide an important 
context for the quantified performance indicators. To 
address this issue, we recommend that all upward-
accounting and accountability formats provide scope for, 
and encourage, a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
performance indicators. It is also important for INGOs and 
donors to make clear that they have taken account of the 
qualitative information in more ways than simply by 
incorporating the quantified performance measures into 
their own reporting and decision-making processes. A 
further recommendation in this area is to allow debate and 
discussion with officers and beneficiaries in the field to 
help determine the nature of appropriate performance 
indicators for specific projects. These recommendations 
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might make donor assessment of project performance 
more complex, because in many cases they would not be 
able to rely to such a great extent as at present on a fairly 
simple aggregation of common performance metrics to 
judge the effectiveness of their aid programmes. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that such a simple 
aggregation does not produce particularly useful insights 
in any case.
failures and unintended consequences
Upward-accounting and accountability mechanisms 
usually either do not provide scope for, or are perceived to 
discourage, the reporting of unintended consequences or 
failures in aspects of the delivery of aid projects. 
Understanding by NGOs and donors of these unintended 
consequences and failures would provide an important 
learning opportunity to help improve the shape and 
delivery of current and future projects. Nonetheless, there 
was a general recognition of a reluctance to report these 
issues, even where upward-reporting formats give scope 
for the provision of this type of information, because of the 
risk that, if the NGO is seen to have failed, future funding 
might be threatened. To ensure that the effectiveness of 
current and future aid projects can be improved through 
learning from unintended consequences, mistakes and 
failures in existing projects, it is important that upward-
accountability reporting formats provide scope for, and 
encourage, the reporting of these issues. Furthermore, it is 
important for donors to signal clearly that they recognise 
the value of this type of information and that they will use the 
information constructively – rather than ‘punishing’ failures.
Differing priorities
Some forms of partnership arrangements give rise to 
accountability problems owing to tensions between the 
priorities of INGO local branches and those of the local 
community-based partner NGOs delivering the services. It 
is advisable that the memoranda of understanding 
between donors, INGOs and local partners are clear about 
the accounting and accountability responsibilities and 
expectations of each party. It is also important that donors 
and INGOs do not demand additional information from 
local partners, over and above that agreed in the 
memoranda of understanding, unless they clearly explain 
the reasons why this information is required, and the 
benefits to the local partner NGO of the provision and use 
of this information.
communication and feedback
The above recommendations mostly require a two-way 
flow of information. In addition to the existing upward flows 
from officers and partners in the field to INGOs and 
donors, there is a need for interaction through 
communication from donors to INGOs and thence back to 
those officers and partners, and the beneficiaries. Within 
this study there was, however, little evidence that donors 
engage in meaningful accountability reporting to the NGO 
field officers. One officer commented that there is a 
nationwide problem of ‘lack of feedback’ (NGO 13, an 
officer). Although reports are constantly sent upwards to 
donors, very few reports come back to the NGOs from 
those donors.
Some INGO officers indicated that they receive country 
reports from the international head office. These reports 
are highly summarised and do not tend to focus 
specifically on the projects carried out by individual NGO 
offices. Feedback from the donors, where available, is 
limited in scope and detail. In other instances, NGO 
officers suggested that they do have a chance to comment 
on issues in response to specific questions asked by their 
parent INGOs/country offices. These tend, however, to be 
in response to donor requests for extra information. For 
example, one donor NGO shares the development of 
reporting templates with the field officers. There is also 
some limited consultation between the donors and field 
officers facilitated through meetings held to develop 
strategic plans for the work of the NGO. These meetings 
tend to be regional meetings and do not focus on the work 
of individual NGO offices or individual aid projects. To 
implement the above recommendations effectively, these 
limited instances of interactive communication and more 
holistic accountability between donors, INGOs, field 
officers, beneficiaries and partners will need to be 
developed.
The next chapter of this report considers the impacts of 
the main downward and more holistic accountability 
mechanisms that are currently used by the NGOs in this 
study. It also makes recommendations and suggestions for 
new mechanisms intended to help improve the 
effectiveness of development aid projects. 
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5.1 INtRODuctION
Although the upward-accounting and accountability 
mechanisms discussed in Chapter 4 tend to be aimed 
primarily at donors, there was much evidence that the 
needs of beneficiary groups are being identified and 
discussed within more holistic, participatory accountability 
mechanisms. Broadly, beneficiaries are involved in the 
initial planning stages as well as in the evaluation stages of 
the projects, and accountability in the form of information 
flows between NGOs and beneficiaries occurs both 
formally and informally. 
The more participatory accountability mechanisms have 
advantages as well as problems. A critical issue is the 
extent to which the participatory methods and 
mechanisms allow the views of beneficiaries to influence 
service delivery. For instance, one officer at an NGO 
suggested that implementation of accountability upwards 
to donors is not problematic; rather, it is the enactment of 
accountability downwards to beneficiaries that remains 
difficult. Although there are often downward-accountability 
mechanisms in place, the effectiveness of these in practice 
was seen to depend upon the type of aid project and how 
well the field officers ‘sensitised’ (in other words, 
‘prepared’) beneficiaries to engage with these processes 
and the issues they covered. 
The field officers recognised that downward accountability 
was a key aspect of the rights-based approach to 
development that has been promoted by many NGOs to 
their beneficiaries for several years. This rights-based 
approach aims to ensure that beneficiaries (or ‘rights 
claimers’) know what they have a right to expect from 
those who have a duty to provide aid (donors, NGOs and 
so on), and also aims to ensure that the ‘rights claimers’ 
take ownership of aid processes by being aware of their 
rights and ‘being responsible to demand and sustain 
services’ (field officer’s comment at feedback session). As 
such, field officers saw downward-accountability 
mechanisms, identifying and accommodating the views 
and experiences of beneficiaries, as being important in 
helping beneficiaries to articulate their needs and to seek 
to ensure that these needs were addressed.
Evidence presented in this chapter indicates that from the 
perception of NGO officers and beneficiaries, there are 
clear benefits from involving beneficiaries in the 
accountability process. In order to gain the full benefits of 
holistic accountability, beneficiaries should be able to 
influence and negotiate with NGOs. This chapter addresses 
issues such as power, illiteracy and poverty that may 
inhibit beneficiaries from engagement in the NGO 
accountability process. It also makes suggestions for 
improvements in existing downward-accountability 
mechanisms, and for the development of new 
mechanisms, based on insights provided by the 
participants in this study. This analysis covers the following 
areas, each of which is discussed in a separate section:
participatory accountability mechanisms and •	
influencing at the planning stages of new projects
participatory accountability mechanisms at the •	
evaluation stages of existing projects
issues of the relative power between donors, NGOs and •	
beneficiaries, affecting the willingness of some parties 
to express their opinions freely in negotiations and 
other forms of downward-accountability engagements
suggestions for new accountability mechanisms at local •	
level to help improve the role of accounting and 
accountability in enhancing the effectiveness of aid 
projects.
5.2 pARtIcIpAtORy AccOuNtAbIlIty AND 
INflueNcING At the plANNING stAGes
Most NGO officers indicated that the views of beneficiaries 
are considered at the planning stages of new projects. 
Although this perspective was supported by some of the 
beneficiaries during the focus group interviews held with 
them, it was apparent that the overall agendas are largely 
being set by the NGOs. For example, in circumstances 
where an NGO funds only particular types of aid project, 
beneficiaries’ views on their needs for other types of aid 
could not be accommodated.
Participatory accountability in the planning processes for 
new projects tends to involve both the specific 
beneficiaries of particular projects and the wider 
communities. For education projects, for example, these 
processes tend to include teachers, parents and children. 
For some development projects the initial consultation 
involves all members of the local community of potential 
beneficiaries. Meetings are often held with men and 
women separately to encourage freer discussion, as in 
some communities there are traditions that inhibit women 
from expressing themselves in the presence of men. 
These participatory planning meetings are often 
undertaken in response to specific requirements from 
donors to hold such meetings, and NGO officers tend to 
include photographic evidence of community and 
beneficiary engagement as part of their reports to donors.
Where service delivery is undertaken through partners, it 
is the partners who usually interact with the beneficiaries. 
Nevertheless, in these situations the NGO officers often 
attempt to gain direct information by meeting with 
beneficiaries to see whether the issues identified and 
reported by partners are ‘real issues on the ground’ (NGO 
9, an officer). 
A key benefit of participatory accountability at the 
planning stage of new projects is that it allows for a needs 
analysis to be undertaken. One officer at an NGO that 
provides micro-credit schemes explained:
5. Impacts of downward-accountability mechanisms 
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We have been interacting with the communities…we 
don’t just impose things on them. They have to come out 
and say that they need credit and then we assess their 
situation. Then we encourage them to form groups. So 
during the community interactions, you will see that the 
community will be raising issues about credit…You plan 
based on this. (NGO 8, an officer)
It seems that the community meetings are mainly initiated 
and led by NGO field officers. Thus the needs analysis is 
undertaken following the NGO’s own criteria, thereby 
potentially restricting its effectiveness.
We animate them and tell them the exact rules and then 
we let them understand what we are there for and what 
we can do….If they agree to the criteria then they apply. 
(NGO 13, an officer)
In this context, insights from both the interviews with NGO 
officers and the beneficiary focus groups indicated that in 
practice potential beneficiaries rarely, if ever, decline the 
NGO criteria at the inception stage of new projects. This 
raises issues of the relative power in practice between 
NGO officers and beneficiaries, issues that are addressed 
in section 5.4.
A risk arising from this form of participatory accountability 
mechanism, therefore, is that the actual needs of 
beneficiaries are not identified or met in the planning of 
projects. The requirements of donors and NGOs may 
continue to dominate even though beneficiaries are 
involved in the accountability mechanism, because the 
beneficiary involvement is constrained within the rules set 
out for the beneficiaries by the NGO officers, and because 
some beneficiaries lack the willingness to express needs at 
variance with their perceptions of the NGOs’ aid agendas. 
Discussions with field officers and beneficiaries during the 
focus group meetings for this research project revealed 
that financial issues tend not to be discussed with 
beneficiaries in participatory planning meetings – other 
than in some instances where beneficiary communities 
have to provide labour as part of an aid project. Therefore 
the beneficiaries are not always aware of the costs of 
projects or the total amount of funds available for a 
specific project (or programme of projects). An exception 
to this found during this study was where one large INGO 
shared financial information with beneficiaries. Even with 
this NGO there was, however, no evidence that the 
beneficiaries had questioned the officers about project 
finance or attempted to find out how much was available. 
This may have been (partially) caused by a lack of financial 
literacy among the highly impoverished beneficiary 
groups, and/or it may be related to issues of power – with 
beneficiaries reluctant to be seen to question those who 
are delivering aid relief to them (this issue is further 
explored in section 5.4 below).
NGO officers indicated that trying to meet beneficiary 
needs as articulated in participatory meetings at the 
planning stage can be fraught with problems. Apart from 
the possibility that mutually exclusive beneficiary needs 
will be identified as a result of the consultations, the 
availability of funding dictates the extent to which 
beneficiary needs identified through the consultations can 
be met. One officer lamented this.
Sometimes you see their real needs but you are directed 
by funding so you may have to prioritise which one would 
bring a more desirable impact on the community that you 
are working with. (NGO 6, an officer)
This means that the officers have to manage situations of 
conflict both among beneficiaries and between the 
beneficiaries and the NGO. To deal with these situations, 
the officers have to prioritise needs. Some needs may be 
only partly financed, with other needs postponed until 
funding becomes available. In addition to this, 
communities are sometimes directed to alternative NGOs 
and donors. The extent to which the officers make the 
decision about prioritisation remains unclear as some 
officers suggested that all prioritisation was made by the 
communities themselves and/or partners, while others 
admitted to steering the communities more closely.
We don’t make the decision. We leave that to the 
community and the partners but we provide technical 
support in terms of analysis and the issues at stake. But 
in terms of what they want to proceed with, we leave it to 
them. But when we think that…a good analysis hasn’t 
gone into that, we cut into the process by trying to point 
out the impact on whatever intervention they want. (NGO 
6, an officer) 
If you go to a community and they say our priority is not 
water, our priority is micro credit….Then we probably 
sensitise or redirect them to other assignments or other 
NGOs that are within the district. (NGO 12, an officer)
In addition, there was a belief among some field officers 
that too much community consultation and dialogue 
during the planning stages of new projects can retard the 
progress of projects. This is because community 
consultation and dialogue takes time and resources, and 
more resources are sometimes needed by NGOs to engage 
effectively in the community consultations and dialogues 
necessary within the participatory downward-accountability 
mechanisms involved in planning a new aid project.
5.3 pARtIcIpAtORy AccOuNtAbIlIty At the 
evAluAtION stAGes
In addition to being undertaken at the outset of new 
projects, participatory accountability with beneficiaries is 
also undertaken through the beneficiaries’ involvement 
with the monitoring and evaluation of projects. The 
facilitation of learning and reflection, through these 
participatory reviews, was generally considered to be of 
great importance. It was maintained by many field officers 
that although these reviews could be used to criticise 
aspects of projects (although in practice such criticism 
from beneficiaries was rare), an important role of the 
reviews is provision of feedback to both NGOs and 
beneficiaries, and enabling NGOs to ascertain if they are 
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‘on the right path’ with a particular project, ‘to help you 
shape what you are doing’ (field officer’s comment at 
feedback session).
In some cases the beneficiaries are involved with the 
monitoring of projects throughout their duration as well as 
at the end, but NGO officers were cautious about whether 
these accountability mechanisms are effective. Although 
some benefits were regarded as accruing from beneficiary 
involvement through this form of downward accountability, 
the officers generally believed there was room for 
improvement.
Within this participatory accountability mechanism at the 
evaluation stages of projects, the norm seems to be for 
beneficiaries to comment on NGO activities and for these 
comments to be incorporated in narrative form in the 
upward-accountability reports to intermediate INGOs and/
or donors. There is a tendency for officers to use 
beneficiaries’ informal anecdotes of NGO performance in 
their accountability reports. These evaluatory approaches, 
although useful, were regarded as less informative in 
practice than they might have been because beneficiaries 
tend not to be critical of the NGOs. During the focus group 
meetings conducted for this research project, much 
deference was shown to the NGO officers by the 
beneficiaries. This reinforces observations regarding the 
possibility that power dynamics affect the willingness of 
beneficiaries to voice concerns they may have (an issue 
explored in section 5.4).
Some participatory accountability processes encourage 
communities to identify and specify performance 
indicators during the planning stage of a new project, and 
then to comment on the achievements of these 
performance indicators during the participatory review 
process at the evaluation stages. Although this is not a 
common practice among the NGOs interviewed for this 
study, it was generally considered most beneficial by the 
interviewees – even where they did not practice it 
themselves. An officer from an NGO which had a 
particularly well-developed participatory approach 
explained that this method allowed beneficiaries to have 
their own understanding of the results of the NGO 
interventions: ‘We collectively agree on indicators. So you 
ask them…and they tell you that “if I do this I will earn 
more income”. If you go further to probe, “what will show 
that you have earned income?” They will say “if I’m able to 
pay my child’s school fees”’ (NGO 9, an officer).
That this approach to accounting for performance would 
be beneficial was exemplified by another officer who 
worked in an NGO where this type of accountability 
mechanism was not used. To her, introducing it would 
enhance accountability to beneficiary stakeholders.
The other thing I would like to change is much more 
forums at community level, much more in terms of the 
community participation in monitoring of activities and 
coming up with indicators that they think [are] a measure 
of success rather than the organisation doing it and then 
using it to assess themselves. (NGO 13, an officer)
5.4 AccOuNtAbIlIty AND the ‘pOweRless’
Despite the many benefits associated with the involvement 
of beneficiaries in the accountability processes, it was 
obvious from several comments made by officers that 
many of the more strategic benefits associated with 
downward accountability have not yet been realised. 
Although several field officers explained that beneficiaries 
can and do negotiate, and these negotiations have 
changed some decisions, there was a perception that 
many beneficiaries consider themselves to be in a very 
weak negotiating position owing to a fear of losing the 
benefits from NGO aid projects. This fear is acute because 
of the poverty and resultant vulnerability of beneficiaries.
In these cases, beneficiaries have limited bargaining or 
negotiating power with the NGOs, or regard the NGOs with 
a high degree of deference, so the beneficiaries remain 
relatively powerless. Many field officers explained that, as a 
result of this, beneficiaries do not often criticise NGOs or 
the delivery of aid projects.
This sense of powerlessness was evident within the focus 
group meetings held with beneficiaries. For example, the 
beneficiaries in a micro-credit finance group were anxious 
not to be seen to be criticising the NGO. The beneficiaries 
wanted a higher capital injection from the NGO but found 
it difficult to demand more funds. They also wanted the 
repayment terms adjusted, but during the focus group 
meeting admitted that they had not informed the NGO, as 
the following excerpt from the focus group meeting 
demonstrates.
A: Truly, the money they [the NGO] have given us, we are not 
saying is small, and therefore we thank [name of NGO]…very 
much for that. 
Q: Do you encounter difficulties in the mode of repayment?
A: Truly, the weekly pay puts undue pressure on us. There 
are some of us who would have liked to be paying monthly. 
Therefore, if it were made monthly for us it would have been 
better than weekly.
Q: Have you presented that concern to [name of NGO]?
A: We have not yet told them. 
Not fully informing the NGOs of their own needs was 
prevalent among the beneficiaries and arguably reflects 
these beneficiaries’ own sense of not being able to bargain 
for change in NGO work. In another focus group meeting, a 
beneficiary revealed what he labelled a ‘secret’ about 
which he wanted funders to be aware:
There is a secret I want to reveal to the big people. That 
problem has been worrying us a lot. Once in a while we 
hear of [place name] getting development projects, but 
we do not get it, and this issue is worrying. Therefore that 
secret must be revealed to the big people, so that it will 
also be documented to enable them to assist us. We have 
not told [name of NGO] about it.
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Nonetheless, the reluctance of beneficiaries to voice 
criticism of an NGO, or the way aid projects were delivered, 
was not universal. Some fieldworkers argued that the 
issues of self-perceived relative powerlessness of 
beneficiaries could be addressed, to a certain extent, if 
field officers prepared the ground for more open feedback. 
An important element in this was signals from INGOs and 
donors that they welcomed criticism and used this 
criticism constructively in shaping future projects and 
changing the details in existing projects.
Furthermore, certain types of aid project were associated 
with beneficiaries who were more ready to express their 
views. For example, when working with beneficiaries who 
had mental health problems, one NGO field officer found 
that many such beneficiaries were not inhibited from 
giving forthright feedback on their views of the services 
they had received from the NGO. 
In addition to a perceived fear among beneficiaries of 
losing projects if they criticise an NGO too strongly, 
another dimension that relates to potential power 
imbalances between NGOs and beneficiaries in downward-
accountability engagements is the capacity of beneficiaries 
to engage meaningfully in downward-accountability 
processes. Some field officers explained that beneficiaries 
are often overwhelmed with challenges from day-to-day 
living, so do not have the ability to spend much time 
reflecting or providing feedback to the officers. This is 
often coupled with, and compounded by, a relatively low 
capacity by many beneficiaries to understand fully the 
issues and external pressures involved in a particular aid 
project. Such understanding was argued by many of the 
field officers to be necessary if the beneficiaries were to be 
able to criticise aspects of particular projects effectively. To 
address this low capacity of some beneficiaries to engage 
in criticism, it was believed to be important for NGOs to 
prepare beneficiaries adequately for feedback meetings, 
for example by ‘sensitising’ them to the positive and 
negative issues and by ensuring that the accountability 
dialogue used the local language. If NGOs ‘sensitise’ the 
beneficiaries to the key issues, however, it could be argued 
that this perpetuates the power imbalance between the 
NGOs and their beneficiaries, as it ‘directs’ the 
beneficiaries to focus on certain issues ‘chosen’ by the 
NGO. This could therefore limit or preclude beneficiaries’ 
constructive criticism of other aspects of a project that are 
of concern to them.
Another way in which these issues are (partially) 
addressed is where community leaders are asked to act as 
intermediaries, feeding back to and from the beneficiaries 
they represent. This seems to have been relatively 
successful in ascertaining a broader range of underlying 
views of the beneficiaries. For example, one NGO described 
a process of using committee members selected by the 
community of beneficiaries to report back to the 
community. As he explained: 
The committees also account to the entire community 
membership for their stewardship. Then the community 
members are able to decide who should continue and 
who should be withdrawn and replaced. (NGO 13, an 
officer)
In practice, the nature of NGO engagement with 
beneficiaries often has to be different from the regular 
participatory engagements before the beneficiaries 
contribute views that can ensure that their needs are 
articulated and can therefore be addressed. For example, 
it was only through a social audit process that one NGO 
was able to gain any feedback about water pipes that they 
had provided. The social audit was led by community 
members and seen to be informal so the community 
members were able to question the NGO. In contrast, the 
participatory meetings were seen by the beneficiaries to 
be formal meetings, and therefore they did not criticise the 
work of the NGO. One officer explained that during a social 
audit the beneficiaries became more empowered to 
contribute their views.
‘You have brought us pipelines. Go and see whether the 
water is running. There is no water. You have not even 
followed up to see whether the water is running’. This 
question came up during the social audit and not through 
the normal participatory meeting. It did not come through 
the normal participatory process, because that looked 
like a formal meeting. (NGO 9, an officer)
5.5 summARy AND suGGestIONs fOR New 
AccOuNtAbIlIty mechANIsms
This chapter has discussed key perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of existing downward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms. It has also discussed the key 
issues that appear to inhibit the more effective 
development and use of downward-accountability 
mechanisms in the quest to improve the effectiveness of 
aid delivery. 
There was general recognition among NGOs of the 
potential benefits of participatory reviews that solicit and 
incorporate the views and experiences of beneficiaries at 
the planning and review stages of projects. In practice, 
some of these benefits are not fully realised owing to the 
inhibitions of some beneficiaries in expressing their true 
opinions (because of a perceived fear that aid would be 
withdrawn), compounded by lack of capacity of some 
beneficiaries to engage fully with downward-accountability 
mechanisms. 
In addition to a need to implement practices designed to 
counteract the negative effects of the power imbalances on 
the crucial and effective involvement of beneficiaries in the 
downward-accountability processes, this study has 
identified (from the views of field officers) a range of new 
accountability mechanisms that could be developed to 
help capitalise on the benefits of more holistic forms of 
accountability in practice. These are as follows.
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Mechanisms should be developed to disseminate best 
accountability practice between NGOs. For example, 
several field officers were aware that some NGOs use 
community-based ‘accountability notice boards’ to 
communicate with beneficiaries, and they believed that 
their NGOs might benefit from adopting this practice. A 
related suggestion was for NGOs to facilitate a range of 
activities to help and encourage stakeholders to discuss 
information placed on accountability notice boards, and to 
reflect on this information.
NGOs should involve a broader range of stakeholders in 
the annual planning and budgeting of their activities – 
beneficiaries should be involved in more than just the 
annual review of individual projects.
Each NGO should use local radio and community radio 
phone-in programmes to facilitate discussion and 
engagements between itself and a range of its 
stakeholders, or even discussion between a number of 
NGOs and their stakeholders.
NGOs could make documentaries of project activities, 
involving beneficiaries in the making of these 
documentaries. For this purpose, they should develop 
some success stories as exemplars, explaining what the 
situation was before an NGO started a local project, the 
changes that occurred in this situation once the project 
had commenced, and including voices from beneficiaries.
NGOs should develop practices such that, in the early 
stages of a new project, the communities understand their 
responsibilities more fully. Before a project starts, this 
should include discussion and agreement between all 
parties about the accountability mechanisms that will be 
used and the information that each party will be expected 
to produce.
NGOs could develop peer review practices both to 
disseminate best practice (for both accounting and 
accountability mechanisms, and project implementation) 
and to identify and help any NGOs that are performing 
ineffectively. Such ‘lateral accountability mechanisms’ 
could also be useful to help field officers to put peer 
pressure on some INGOs if they identify practices at other 
NGOs that they consider would benefit their own 
operations. As noted in section 3.7 in Chapter 3, although 
such self-regulation mechanisms are discussed in the 
academic and practitioner literature there was no evidence 
of their use in practice at the local level in the NGOs 
studied in this research project – although several NGO 
field officers suggested that such peer review mechanisms 
would be useful.
Donors should automatically provide feedback to NGOs, 
field officers and beneficiaries
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6.1 summARy
In 2008, governments of OECD countries spent 
approximately US$135 billion on development aid, and are 
committed to spending over twice this amount each year 
(as a proportion of national income) by 2015. This is in 
addition to amounts donated by private individuals, 
charitable foundations and corporations. Much of this aid 
is channelled through NGOs to individual projects. 
Given the amount of aid funding, a small increase or 
decrease in the effectiveness with which aid funding is 
deployed can have a substantial impact on the lives of 
many highly impoverished people whom the aid is 
intended to benefit. An increase in the effectiveness of aid 
projects can mean that many more people are able to 
benefit from the outcomes of aid funding. The accounting 
and accountability mechanisms employed by these NGOs 
can both contribute towards and impede the effectiveness 
with which aid funding is deployed in individual aid 
projects. 
Within this context, the aims of the present research 
project have been to investigate, through the experiences 
of those operating on aid projects at the NGO fieldwork 
level, the impact of different accounting and accountability 
mechanisms on the effectiveness of aid delivery. By 
investigating this issue, and identifying the types of 
accounting and accountability mechanism that enhance 
aid effectiveness and those that have a potentially 
dysfunctional impact on aid effectiveness, this study aims 
to contribute towards the formulation of NGO accounting 
and accountability policies that will be effective in 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness with which aid 
funding is transformed into a reduction in human suffering 
in impoverished nations.
To fulfil its aims, the research project addressed the 
following five specific objectives:
1. to identify characteristics of the key mechanisms of 
accountability employed in a sample of International 
and local NGOs (in Ghana) 
2. to provide evidence of beneficial and dysfunctional 
impacts of the accountability mechanisms (identified 
under objective 1.) on the effectiveness of aid delivery
3. to explain why particular accountability mechanisms 
are considered beneficial or dysfunctional
4. to assess the extent of beneficiary involvement in the 
accountability mechanisms identified under objective 
1. and to investigate the factors preventing and/or 
facilitating accountability to beneficiaries, and
5. to suggest alternative mechanisms of accountability 
that may alleviate the potentially dysfunctional impacts 
of donor-led upward-accountability mechanisms, and 
encourage the involvement of officers and beneficiaries 
in the field.
In addressing the study’s aims and objectives, the 
researchers have made the following observations and 
recommendations.
Chapter 3 identified the characteristics of a wide variety of 
both upward- and downward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms used across the NGOs in the 
study. In terms of formal upward-accountability reports, 
we used annual reports, interim reports, performance 
assessment reports (written during projects), and 
performance evaluation reports (written at the end of 
individual projects). To assess beneficiary involvement in 
downward-accountability processes, we used community 
consultations and dialogues, participatory reviews (of 
different levels of sophistication), and social auditing. There 
was no evidence of self-regulation in the form of peer 
review at the local level in this study.
Chapter 4 examined the perceptions of NGO officers and 
beneficiaries about the impact of upward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms currently in use. It observed 
that the formality of upward accountability brought with it 
a degree of discipline and accountability that was 
perceived to work for the benefit of aid projects. 
Nonetheless, there were a number of aspects of existing 
upward-accountability mechanisms that officers judged to 
impede improvements in the effectiveness of some aid 
projects. Some of these issues are indicated below, along 
with recommendations for changes intended to ameliorate 
the adverse effects and capitalise on the positive potential 
of upward-accounting and accountability mechanisms.
limitations of upward-accountability reporting
Upward-accountability reporting formats often appear 
inflexible and rarely provide scope for reporting to INGOs 
and donors the views and experiences of officers and 
beneficiaries in the field. Coupled with project 
requirements that are often narrowly and rigidly specified 
by donors, these sometimes inflexible upward-reporting 
mechanisms rarely allow feedback to donors about how 
projects need to be adapted to be more effectively 
delivered in light of local conditions. To address the widely 
perceived adverse effects these issues have had on the 
effectiveness of aid delivery, we recommend that donors 
ensure that their granting of funding entails the 
requirement that NGOs engage in more holistic (downward 
and lateral) accountability engagements with field officers, 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders, and that their 
required upward-accounting and accountability 
mechanisms provide flexibility in reporting formats so that 
a range of possibly unforeseen issues revealed through 
downward accountability can be reported upwards to 
donors.
Donor timescales
Donors’ need for periodic performance reporting that 
demonstrates progress and positive deliverables on a 
project sometimes conflicts with the longer-term nature of 
some projects and the slower pace of work in some 
communities. Addressing this disconnection between the 
time constraints of some donors and the practicalities of 
some types of aid project may require a willingness by 
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donors to recognise that highly beneficial long-term 
outcomes cannot always be delivered in a timescale to suit 
the shorter-term reporting demands and expectations of 
some donor communities. Such a change may require 
some governments in donor nations to embark on long-
term education programmes at home, so that their 
electorates are aware of the important benefits of some 
long-term aid projects, and do not expect payback from all 
aid projects in a time frame to suit four- or five-year 
electoral cycles. An example of such a programme is the 
DfID’s Development Awareness Fund that aims to educate 
people in the UK about the role and benefits of overseas 
aid provision. DfID should ensure that this programme 
raises awareness among the UK electorate about issues of 
aid-project timescales.
problems with quantified performance indicators
Although some quantified performance indicators are 
considered helpful, there is a concern that in many cases 
there is an unhelpful dominance of such indicators, which 
predominate over the qualitative information about 
performance that is necessary for the interpretation of 
performance metrics. Even where upward-accountability 
mechanisms provide scope for narrative performance 
information, there is a perception that many donors pay 
relatively little attention to the narrative discussion that 
helps to provide an important context for the quantified 
performance indicators. To address this issue, we 
recommend that all upward-accounting and accountability 
formats provide scope for, and encourage, a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative performance indicators. It is 
also important for INGOs and donors to make clear that 
they have taken account of the qualitative information in 
more ways than simply by incorporating the quantified 
performance measures into their own reporting and 
decision-making processes. A further recommendation in 
this area is to attempt to allow debate and discussion with 
officers and beneficiaries in the field to help determine the 
nature of appropriate performance indicators for specific 
projects. These recommendations might make donor 
assessment of project performance more complex, 
because in many cases they would not be able to rely to 
such a great extent as at present on a fairly simple 
aggregation of common performance metrics to judge the 
effectiveness of their aid programmes. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that such a simple aggregation does not 
produce particularly useful insights in any case.
Reporting of unintended consequences and failure
Upward-accounting and accountability mechanisms 
usually either do not provide scope for, or are perceived to 
discourage, the reporting of unintended consequences or 
failures in aspects of the delivery of aid projects. 
Understanding by NGOs and donors of these unintended 
consequences and failures would provide an important 
learning opportunity to help improve the shape and 
delivery of current and future projects. Nonetheless, there 
was a general recognition of a reluctance to report these 
issues, even where upward-reporting formats gave scope 
for the provision of this type of information, because of the 
risk that, if the NGO is seen to have failed, future funding 
might be threatened. To ensure that the effectiveness of 
current and future aid projects can be improved through 
learning from unintended consequences, mistakes and 
failures in existing projects, it is important that upward-
accountability reporting formats provide scope for, and 
encourage, the reporting of these issues. Furthermore, it is 
important for donors to signal clearly that they recognise 
the value of this type of information and that they will use 
the information constructively – rather than ‘punishing’ 
failures.
Differing priorities
Some forms of partnership arrangements give rise to 
accountability problems owing to tensions between the 
priorities of INGO local branches and those of the local 
community-based partner NGOs delivering the services. It 
is advisable that the memoranda of understanding 
between donors, INGOs and local partners are clear about 
the accounting and accountability responsibilities and 
expectations of each party. It is also important that donors 
and INGOs do not demand additional information from 
local partners, over and above that agreed in the 
memoranda of understanding, unless they clearly explain 
the reasons why this information is required, and the 
benefits to the local partner NGO of the provision and use 
of this information.
the recommendations of officers active in the field
Chapter 5 examined NGO officers and beneficiaries’ 
perceptions of the impact of downward-accounting and 
accountability mechanisms currently in use, and outlined 
their recommendations for the following accountability 
mechanisms that could help improve the effectiveness of 
aid delivery.
It may be necessary to develop and implement practices 
that seek to counteract the negative effects of the power 
imbalances between NGOs and beneficiaries, if the crucial 
and effective involvement of beneficiaries in the downward-
accountability processes is to be fully realised.
Mechanisms should be developed to disseminate best 
accountability practice between NGOs. For example, 
several field officers were aware that some NGOs use 
community-based ‘accountability notice boards’ to 
communicate with beneficiaries, and they believed that 
their NGOs might benefit from adopting this practice. A 
related suggestion was for NGOs to facilitate a range of 
activities to help and encourage stakeholders to discuss 
information placed on accountability notice boards, and to 
reflect on this information.
NGOs should involve a broader range of stakeholders in 
the annual planning and budgeting of their activities – 
beneficiaries should be involved in more than just the 
annual review of individual projects.
Each NGO should use local radio and community radio 
phone-in programmes to facilitate discussion and 
engagements between itself and a range of its 
stakeholders, or even discussion between a number of 
NGOs and their stakeholders.
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NGOs could make documentaries of project activities, 
involving beneficiaries in the making of these 
documentaries. For this purpose, they should develop 
some success stories as exemplars, explaining what the 
situation was before an NGO started a local project, the 
changes that occurred in this situation once the project 
had commenced, and including voices from beneficiaries.
NGOs should develop practices such that in the early 
stages of a new project the communities understand their 
responsibilities more fully. Before a project starts, this 
should include discussion and agreement between all 
parties about the accountability mechanisms that will be 
used and the information that each party will be expected 
to produce.
NGOs should develop peer review practices both to 
disseminate best practice (in terms of both accounting 
and accountability mechanisms, and project 
implementation) and to identify and help any NGOs that 
are performing ineffectively. Such ‘lateral accountability 
mechanisms’ could also be useful to help field officers put 
peer pressure on some INGOs if they identify practices at 
other NGOs that they consider would benefit their own 
operations. As noted in section 3.7 in Chapter 3, although 
such self-regulation mechanisms are discussed in the 
academic and practitioner literature there was no evidence 
of their use in practice at the local level in the NGOs 
studied in this research project – although several NGO 
field officers suggested that such peer review mechanisms 
would be useful.
Donors should automatically provide feedback to NGOs, 
field officers and beneficiaries.
6.2 RecOmmeNDAtIONs fOR futuRe ReseARch
The insights provided throughout this study, and the 
recommendations outlined above, provide and suggest 
many avenues of further research into the impact of 
accountability mechanisms on the effectiveness of aid 
delivery and the development of new accounting and 
accountability mechanisms. For example, further research 
work that takes an in-depth look at specific downward-
accountability mechanisms in practice is necessary, as the 
mechanisms of downward accountability continue to be 
under researched. Understanding the factors that 
influence downward accountability and how these 
mechanisms may be strengthened is necessary in order 
for NGOs to gain full benefits of beneficiary involvement in 
the delivery of aid. Further research into the nature of 
unintended consequences deriving from the pressures of 
upward-accountability requirements could also yield 
results to increase the effectiveness of aid delivery. 
Research that takes an organisational approach to study 
and trace all accountability mechanisms employed in a 
number of NGOs of varying sizes (be they local branches 
of international NGOs or small local NGOs) may also 
contribute to a fuller picture, leading to the understanding 
of accountability mechanisms in practice. 
Further research into the variety of NGO accountability 
mechanisms is important in the context of their potential 
to help improve the effectiveness with which current (and 
growing) aid flows (approximately US$135 billion each 
year) are translated into the alleviation of suffering and 
poverty among the world’s vast numbers of deeply 
impoverished people.
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